A Critical Examination of the Effectiveness of Economic Sanctions by the Arab League: A Case Study of Economic Sanctions Against Syria


2.1 Chapter Introduction


The chapter outlines the various situations prevailing in the Arab League that led to application of economic sanction against Syria. Arab League had been primarily being formed for the purpose of regulating relationship and bi-lateral trade in the Arab region. The area has a rich reservoir of natural resources like oil, natural gas, land space, minerals and many more that can be explored and reaped benefits from. Congregation of Arab countries presented the world a powerful force both politically as well as economically sound which can deal with complex modern days challenges that threats nations today, as climatic change, terrorism and so on. The chapter develops a deep understanding of the various features due to which Arab League was formed, starting from its history. The various purposes for the League is also highlighted in this section. The structure and the decision making process of the Arab League has been thoroughly understood in this chapter in order to create a base for further analyzing the reasons for which economic sanctions had been implied on Syria. Syria is a country that is strategically located and had a stable business environment. In the year 1946 Syria became an independent nation and from 1954 there was a revolution that was started in Syria. This revolution was initially a military uphill but later the revolution took a massive form, giving rise to Civil War in that area. The Civil War has led to serious humanitarian crisis in the region and has become the base for further revolution. The Arab League had consecutive number of times requested Syria to maintain peace in the region, but upon consecutive failure it has implied the economic sanction.

2.2 Background of the Arab League:


Arab League is a group of 22 member states in the year 2016 that was established in Cairo in 1945. The member states comprised of Algeria, Bahrain, Comoros, Djibouti, Kingdom of Iraq, Kingdom of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Syrian Republic, Jordan, Yemen, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, State of Palestine, Qatar, Somalia, Sudan, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates. The membership to the Arab League increased dramatically in the latter half of the 20th century, where 15 Arab states were added along with the admission of 4 observers. Chad, Israel and Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic are not members of the Arab Leagues (Hertog, 2007)[14]. The Arab League comprises of several observer states, who are responsible for overseeing the operations of the Arab League. Currently there are four observer states that enables them to express their opinion and advice to other states and can deny them voting rights. The present observer states are Eritrea, Brazil, Venezuela and India. FN

2.2.1 History of the Arab League:

Modern day imposes a lot of diversified challenges upon nations that are difficult to overcome. In order to develop strategically important decisions and solutions to these diversified problems, countries form a congregation amongst similar states so as to deal with these diversified challenges (Bickerton, 2007)[15]. Arab League had been formed primarily to promote cultural, economic and social programs for the member states. Citizens in Arabia view themselves as individuals who are divided across various states with similar background. They have strong cultural, geographical and socio-economic benefits that bind them to form a great Arab Nation. The British Empire existing at that time realized the need for Arab Nation and promised to help them form a united Arab kingdom during the reign of Sherif Hussein of Mecca. The Arabs on the other hand had to cooperate with the British Empire for revolting against the Turkish Ottoman Empire at the time of World War I. This revolt in history is known as the great Arab Revolt, posts which the British betrayed Sherif Hussein and divided the entire Arab region into smaller states (Morris, 2008)[16].

The British Empire required the cooperation from the Arab World again during the conduct of World War II. It was during this time that the Britishers suggested Pan Arabism card by formation of the Arab League. United Kingdom utilized the idea of Arab League for war against Germany, by having Arabs as allies (Lizza, 2011)[17].

When the formation of the League came into existence there were several names suggested by each nation, Iraq suggested Arab Union. Egypt suggested Arab League, Syria suggested Arab Alliance. Egypt’s suggestion was accepted following the change of name to be the League of Arab States.

In the year 1959 the League of Arab League held its first petroleum congress of all member states (Laqueur, 2008) [18]. The congress was to decide on various factors and regulations related to the petrol industry. Year 1964 was a landmark as the League established Cultural, Educational and Scientific Organization. The League gave recognition to the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) as a representative of all Palestinians in the year 1974, in spite of Jordan refusing to the proposal.

In the year 1944 Official Representatives from Iraq, Egypt, Lebanon, North Yemen, Transjordanian, Saudi Arabia met in Alexandria, Egypt for forming the League of Arab States. It was in the year 1945 Arab States signed the Arab League Pact as an official step for inaugurating the League (Pinfari, 2009)[19]. In the year 1945 the Arab League went on to boycott Palestine Jewish businesses which continued till the establishment of Israel. Arab League made several cultural advancements in the year 1946 by signing the Cultural Treaty.

Though the League’s primary motive was to establish prosperity in the region, but internal dissensions from political matters arising from Israel and Palestine, as well as several other Gulf Wars went on to weaken the League. Egypt made a decision beyond the League by signing a peace treaty with Israel on 26th March, 1979 post which Arab League members decided to suspend Egypt’s membership (MacDonald, 2015)[20]. The League decided to suspend Egypt membership on basis of President Anwar Sadat’s visit to Jerusalem and entering into a peace arrangement with Israel. The members met in Bagdad to vote Egypt out from the League thereby transferring its headquarters to Tunis. But Egypt later was readmitted with its membership reassumed in the year 1989. Following such actions, the headquarters was shifted back to Cairo.


The members of the Arab League were divided over the crisis in Kuwait as well as over Saudi Arabia’s invitation to the United States to build its military province. The Gulf crisis led to the eruption of the League and its future became uncertain. The League gained into prominence once it started making positive moves in the Israeli-Lebanese summer war of 2006. The year 1948 was marked by the beginning of the Arab-Israel War which further deepened its impact on the Arab League functioning and developed a situation of mistrust (Chaney, 2012)[21]. It was only in 1950 that the League members signed the Joint Defense and Economic Cooperation Treaty, in order to face future threats. For combating the current military disturbance and economic threat, the treaty was looked upon as a prospective option. Libya joined the Arab League in the year 1953 with the Members of the League establishing the Economic and Social Council. With increasing number of members, the Arab League membership was further extended to Sudan in the year 1956, which shown interests to join the League. Subsequently in the year 1958 Morocco and Tunisia joined the League. It was during this time that the League received a formal recognition from the United Nations’ organization for education, culture as well as for science in Arab area. This proved to be a landmark achievement for the League as till date, it had no formal recognition in the world outside Arabia by an internal body (Taylor, 2015)[22]. Through this step the League’s prominence gradually began taking shape. In the year 1961 and 1962, Kuwait and Algeria joined the Arab League, in order to gain from its membership.

The first official summit for the Arab League was convened in the year 1964 in Cairo, Egypt, where the Arab League Educational, Cultural and Scientific Organization (ALESCO) was formed and its board members were designated. In the autumn months of the same year, a second league summit was convened that established the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). Subsequently in the year 1967 South Yemen joined the League, thereafter in 1971 Oman, Qatar, Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates joined the Arab League. Then in 1973 Mauritania joined membership and in 1974 Somalia as well as Palestine represented by PLO applied for membership to the League and joined it. In 1976 Arab League summit, where all members met in Cairo and for the first time formed and deployed an Arab peacekeeping Syrian force in Lebanon (Burleigh, 2008)[23]. The force was formed with the sole purpose of maintaining peace in the Arab region. In 1977 Djibouti joined the Arab League. Arab League made a controversial progress, in 1987 by endorsing a statement on Iraq’s defense for legitimate rights for disputing Iran. The Arab League again entered a controversial phase in 1990, while conduct of its summit meeting in Baghdad that deeply criticized the West for preventing Iraq, to develop advanced weapon technology. Upon Iraq invasion of Kuwait an emergency summit was called where only 12 out of 20 member states were present and made Yemen to unify with the Arab League. Comoros came ahead and joined the League in 1993 (Toffolo, 2008)[24]. The Gulf Cooperation Council made an advancement to end the secondary as well as tertiary trade embargo against Israel in 1994. But Arab League strongly condemned such actions focusing on the fact that member states cannot bring into effect such enforcements and it is the sole decision that rests on the Arab League. Arab League projected a major proposition in the year 1996 by asking Syria, Iraq and Turkey to share water from the Euphrates and Tigris rivers equally amongst them. This led to further tension in the region, when Syria alleged that construction work in South of Turkey has diverted all water sources of the rivers, thereby restricting their flow. In light of the disturbances and situation persisting in Iraq Arab League Secretary-General condemned using or threatening of any force against Iraq in 1998. The same year Arab League’s interior and justice ministers entered into an agreement for strengthening cooperation against the latest terrorism threats (Kamrava, 2012)[25]. The same year the League also condemned bomb attacks against U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania.

For the first time in history of Arab League in 2002, Arab Peace Initiative was made in Beirut summit, where a proposal was made to normalize relations with Israel. In return Israel had to withdraw from the international recognized borders imposed from 1967, which meant Israel had to evacuate the West Bank, The Golan Heights, the Gaza Strip, east Jerusalem and let the Palestinian refugees to return to their homeland (Colombo, 2012)[26].

Arab League was proving to be incapable to resolve crisis between the United States and Iraq as well as the Israel-Palestinian conflict. Hence in 2002 Libyan leader Muammar al-Gaddafi threatened to withdraw from the League. Finally, in 2003 the League decided to vote for resolution demanding immediate as well as unconditional removal of U.S. along with British soldiers from Iraq. The vote casted was 21-1 favoring the resolution whereas Kuwait casts lone dissenting vote. In the year 2006 Arab League Members made a decision to finally halt every sanction against the Palestinian Government of Hamas. The Arab League let the banks in the region function inside the Gaza strip only for the wide condemnation in Beit Hanun by Israeli Forces (Nassar-McMillan, 2011)[27]. The Arab Peace Initiative was reaffirmed while conducting the summit in Riyadh in 2007. It was only on 25th July 2007, Arab League delegates visited State of Israel in order to discuss a peace initiative and a treaty posed by Hamas as well as other Islamic extremists. Tensions in the Arab region further grew in 20011 when majority black South Sudan voted to secede from the Arabist-led Sudan. This led to a major revolution in the region and governments of Tunisia and Egypt to collapse. This made the Arab League to order suspension of Libya post the Gaddafi regime responded to the countrywide protests by ordering military intervention. The suspension was lifted post Gaddafi’s ouster. The League further went on to suspend Syria in November following protests from its own system (Balfour, 2012)[28].


2.2.2 Purpose of the Arab League


The Arab League had been formed with the sole purpose of maintaining peace and proper conduct in the Arab region hence to enhance development. The purpose of the Arab League is well laid down in the Charter of the Arab League that is also often referred to as the Pact of the League of Arab States. The Pact is considered to be the founding treaty for the League and member states needs to comply by the various norms and regulations laid down by the Charter. The League’s Charter was formed in the year 1945 and it includes the several principles that the Arab-homeland, but member states can abide by such principles while taking into account their own country principles and not avoiding those (Zahlan, 2016)[29]. Thus, the League does not deter the application of the principles of the sovereign member states. The Charter was accepted by the internal regulation of the Council for the Arab League as well as other committees in October, 1951. However the Secretariat-General accepted the regulations in the Charter only in May 1953. After accepting the regulations of the Charter, governance for the League is based on duality of supra-national institutions as well as sovereignty of the member states. Independent states that are ruled in the region by ruling elites derived their strength as well as power from the ruling parties for individual decision making criterion. But the League suffered from the divide between the rich and the poor, which were going to share wealth for being member states of the League, and external powers that might pose a threat to the League, proved to be an obstacle towards the League’s unification (Nye Jr, 2016)[30].

Some additions were further added to the Charter by respective governments of Transjordan, Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, North Yemen, they ratified the Pact thereby joining it.

The Charter lays down that, “the League of Arab States shall be composed of the: independent Arab States that have signed this Pact.”

The various members within the Arab League, includes various types of governments such as monarchies, absolute and constitutional and republic. Only Iraqi Kurdistan is officially an Autonomous Entity within the League, but other members consider Palestine as an Autonomous Entity within Israel. Though Palestinian Authority exerts some sovereign powers within Israel, but it is not yet a fully independent government and operates within the boundaries. The territories that are PA administered are recognized internationally occupied by Israel but is not a part of the country. The League has given recognition to State of Palestine as being an independent State with Jerusalem being its capital, and acts as Embassies in all 20 member states excluding Somalia (Lesch D. W., 2011)[31].





Figure 2 : Member States Government Types

Source : (Hertog, 2007)[32]




2.2.3 Structure of the Arab League

The Arab League, is officially referred to as the League of Arab States and is a regional organization comprising of Arab States, along with North and Northeast Africa. The League is made up of 22 member states and its primary aim is to;

“draw closer the relations between member States and co-ordinate collaboration between them, to safeguard their independence and sovereignty, and to consider in a general way the affairs and

interests of the Arab countries (ArabLeagueOnline, Retrieved on 10th Sepetember, 2016)[33].”

The League includes several responsibilities for the member states including political, economic, cultural and social for promoting the well-being. It serves as a forum to address various issues of member states, hence co-ordinate various policies amongst members such as to reduce disputes and to limit the number of disputes in the Arab region, like the Lebanon Crisis of 1958. The member states have further agreed and signed an agreement on Joint Defense and Economic Cooperation on the 13th of April, 1950, in order to coordinate defense military measures (Coskun, 2008)[34]. The League has also demonstrated vital role in shaping school level curriculum and advancing role of Arab women in societies. The League have further promoted child welfare, youth and sports program, preserving their cultural heritage and exchanging cultures amongst member states. There are several literacy campaigns and initiatives launched by the League, along with modern technology introduction, production of intellectual works amongst member states. The League has taken several measures in regards to crime and drug abuse as well as dealt with labor issues especially emigrant Arab labor force.


Figure 3 : Structure of the Arab League

Source : (ArabLeagueSummit2013, Retrieved on 10th Sepetmber, 2016)


The Secretary-General of the League is Ahmad Aboul Gheit and he has assumed office from the 3rd of July, 2016 and is represented from Egypt. The above structure represents the body of the Arab League, apart from this the subsidiary body of the League consists of Arab Women’s Committee, Committee of Arab Experts on Cooperation, Communications Committee, Conference of Liaison Officers, Cultural Committee, Health Committee, Human Rights Committee, Information Committee, Legal Committee, Organization of Youth Welfare, Political Committee, Social Committee and Permanent Committee for Administrative and Financial Affairs (Yacoubian, 2008)[35].


The League’s Defense and Economic Cooperation Bodies include Arab Unified Military Command, Joint Defense Council, Economic Council, and Permanent Military Commission.

The Arab Deterrent Force includes Administrative Tribunal of the Arab League, Special Bureau for Boycotting Israel and Arab Fund for Technical Assistance to African and Arab Countries (AFTAAAC). The League has offices in several parts of the world including Argentina, U.S.A, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Ethiopia, Greece, Germany, India, Japan, Italy, Kenya, Japan, Russia, Switzerland, Senegal and Spain (Cox, 2006)[36].


2.2.4 Decision-Making Process of the Arab League


The decision making methodology for an international organization such as the Arab League has a detrimental role and needs to be more centralized, based on voting rights. In Arab League decisions are taken jointly by member states and each have their voting rights, which they exercise, every country hold a vote of a single value (Abou-Zeid, 2006)[37]. The functional responsibility of the League rests with the Summit, the Permanent Committee, the Secretariat, Transitional Arab Parliament, and the (non) formally institutionalized special Council of Ministers. The responsibility for holding an annual meeting in March every year rests with the Summit. In case of emergency an informal or a special meeting can be summoned in between two formal meetings. The leader of the member states are provided with forum for guiding developments, by the summit. The summit is also responsible for providing Arab voice on vital issues such that it is able to pass influencing resolutions for the Council. The summit does not provide development of specific policies, the responsibility of which rests with the Council along with the Standing Committee. The Council of the League has a decision power theoretically at level 6 and the Permanent Committee has the responsibility for drawing on a variety of policies (Acharya, 2007)[38].

The Joint Defense Council as well as the Economic and Social Council is responsible for facilitating cooperation in military and economic fields in the Arab world. the Council makes plans and the sub-institutions are responsible for sharing power and carrying out plans in relevant areas of applications. The sub-councils decision-making capabilities are limited, temporary and relative in nature rather than being independent and absolute.

The administrative and mediating institution in the League is the Secretariat, which regulates everyday functioning and implementing as well as facilitating a wide variety of policy (McDermott, 2007)[39]. The Council of Ministers comprising of twelve member states, meet regularly and holds meetings in respective areas and then submit their final consensus on matters to the Secretariat as well as the Council.

Therefore, from the above analysis of power it can be derived that the summit overly guides the League at macro level, whereas the Council along with the Committee is responsible for constructing policy framework, on which the Council of Ministers provide necessary advice. While incorporating in vital and critical decisions regarding pertinent matters as compared to regional cooperative organizations, the Arab League accepts principles of “unanimity” and “domestic law”, that implies the member states needs to apply the final decision regarding such issues. The local government is responsible for manipulating the draft of the Council and thereby applying policies provided by the League. The “final-consensus” is the final compromised outcome for the member states within the League (Brand, 2013)[40].

The League had not been able to apply functional institutions like the European Commission or Committee on Foreign Affairs (AFET) that takes on vital responsibility of the form of supranational institutions. The League is a regional congregation of states in matter of politics, economic and security hence it requires more power for the functional institutions of the League. But the power provided to the League does not meet such requirements. An ideal example includes the Transitional Arab Parliament possesses no legislative power.

Though the League consists of nineteen functional organizations but they are merely subordinates serving as medium for communications. The Greater Arab Free Trade Area (GAFTA) is a pact made by the League to form an economic bloc between the member states such that they can compete on an international platform (Yetiv, 2011)[41]. The League need to have appointed a supranational institution for managing this pact, for assuaging interferences from member states. The Free Trade Area operational committee lags such powers. The committee was effective to an extent by boosting free trade, by reinforcing important negotiations amongst governments without powerful supranational institutions and to fulfill “spillover effect” by some institutionalists.

The decision-making process in the League is dependent on negotiations amongst the member states. Institutionalism theory states that stimulator for any kind of integrative organization is the collective interests of member states. The various decision-making bodies might transform the common interests of member states into common policies, but the degree of acceptance of these policies is dependent upon the interests of the countries concerned. In the integration of the whole process, homogeneity degree of member states concerned has a primary impact. When the common interests is more, the more common requirements and hence more common policies will be formed by the member states (Katz, 2006)[42]. In case the member states disregard any interests then it will only dampen implementing relevant policies for the League. The implementation of a policy for a League is largely dependent on the member states and their respective interests. In case the gap in the common interests increases, it will be greatly be difficult to implement and adopt any policy in particular that will be constructive to the functional institution. Obstacle in implementing a policy can only be overcome by negotiating ties among member states.






2.3 Background of the Situation of Syria


The Syrian Arab Republic is a country is Western Asia, sharing its borders with Lebanon on one side, Mediterranean Sea in the west, Iraq in the east, Turkey to the north, Jordan to the south and Israel in the southwest. The country was previously home to large number of diversified ethnic groups as well as religious groups including Greek Armenians, Syrian Arabs, Kurds, Assyrians, Mandeans, Circassians and Turks. There are various religious groups including Yazidis, Salafis, Sunnis, Christians, Druze, Alawites, Mandeans and Shiites (Jenkins, 2014)[43]. The modern state of Syria was formed post Ottoman control of World War I of French mandate ended. Syria gained independence as a parliamentary republic only on 24 October, 1945 when Syria joined to form United Nations. The French troops did not leave Syria till April 1946 and post-independence the country was marked by turbulence and large number of military coups from the period of 1949-71. Though Syria entered into an union with Egypt in the year 1961, it was terminated within a short period by Syria coup d’etat. The republic of Syria came into existence after constitutional referendum was formed in December 1961 (Fearon J. D., 2007)[44]. From that time Ba’athist coup d’etat maintained power in the country. But Syria have been in a state of emergency from the year 1963 to 2011 which suspended constitutional protection for its citizens and governmental systems. Bashar al-Assad is the president in the country succeeding his father Hafez al-Assad.

Syria is a member of Non-aligned Movement apart from a member of United Nations, but it has been suspended from the Arab League in November 2011 and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation. It has itself suspended from Union for the Mediterranean as since March 2011 Syria has been rising against the Assad and Ba’athist government, who is a part of Arab Spring (Carpenter, 2013)[45]. The consecutive meltdown in the state resulted in Syrian Civil War and the country is now referred to as the most violent countries of the world. There are a number of pseudo-state entities that have gained prominence in the state including the Syrian Opposition, Islamic State of Iraq and Syria and the Federation of Northern Syria.

2.3.1 When did the revolution start? Why?


The unrest and civil war in Syria is a result of a multi-sided conflict in which arms and ammunition with international intervention has taken place. The situation in Syria had been in unrest following its independence, but the war situation worsened during the Arab Spring of 2011, when arms conflicted started, after President Bashar al-Assad’s government violently suppressed the protests. The revolution and its various reasons causing it has been explained later in the chapter (Salehyan, 2006)[46]. But now the war has been amongst several factions in the state, as the Syrian Democratic Forces, Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), Salafi jihadist groups that includes al-Nusra Front. These factions are said to receive constant aid and military support from foreign sources resulting in the armed conflict gaining strength.

One of the reason attributed to this war can be the Assad regime in the country that neoliberated economic reforms. These reforms rather than bridging gap, created larger disparities in wealth that further triggered recession and drought, which spread from Arab Spring to Syria. As a result of which protests rose from Kurdish areas which lie north of Syria (Sharara, 2014)[47].

As a result of these rebels, the Syrian opposition formed a Free Syrian Army to take control over area that surrounds Aleppo and southern Syria. The factions diverted its course and from rebels took form of Islamic vision for Syria as al-Nusra Front and ISIL. Though the Syrian government along with external international military support have been trying to maintain peace in the region and reduce the humanitarian crisis. But all efforts have been failing due to the conduct of these rebel groups and hundreds of civilians have already fled the country across the Mediterranean to take shelter in other countries in Europe especially Greece. International organization have deeply condemned such acts against humanity and incapability of the Syrian government to mitigate peace in the region and reduce human rights violation along with multiple massacres (Fearon J. D., 2007)[48]. The Arab League in the view to curb such acts has made economic sanctions against Syria, in an endeavor to curb trades and monetary exchange in the country. The impacts of such sanctions have been later evaluated in Chapter 3 of the study, but such sanctions are said to further deepen and worsen humanitarian crisis rather than solving the complex problems and threats that faces the country.

2.3.2 First revolution 1982

Syria has been disturbed by a series of revolution, primarily caused by the consecutive militant uprising. The first uprising in the country was termed as the first revolution of the 1982 of Syria.

The members of Muslim Brotherhood led to the Islamists uprising which were formed by extreme revolts and armed wars by Sunni Islamists until the year 1976-1982. The main aim of such uprising was to suppress the authority of the Ba’ath party which controlled the Syrian government (Goodarzi, 2006)[49]. The violent events led to mass killing of the civilians, military personnel who were off-duty by the Islamists and the climax of such uprising reached to the formation of Hama Islamic uprising in year 1982.

After the Baathist government came into power in the year 1963 it had faced strong opposition from the Muslim brotherhood. In the year 1964 and 1965 massive strikes and protests taken the form of violence in major Syrian cities, especially in Hama which were demolished by the military (Ziser, 2007)[50]. Hama as a town was the opponent of Baathist state. On 31st January 1973 the new constitution formed by Assad led to the national crisis and massive protests by the Muslim brotherhood in Hama, Homs and Aleppo as the new constitution does not demand the Syrian president to be a Muslim. Muslim brotherhood also inscribed Assad as the “enemy of Allah” (King, 2009)[51].

The Muslim brotherhood of the Islam’s continued to disturb the cities of Syria by wide scale assassinations and protests. The day 16th January 1979 led to death toll of 32 cadets who were opened fired in a dining hall where they were invited by Captain Ibrahim Yusuf and further investigation proved that the massacre was planned by spin off of Muslim brotherhood Adnan who was also the group leader who was active member Sunni Islamists guerilla group. This massacre led to the military war against the Ba’ath Party, Alawis, police posts, military vehicles, factories and many other target areas to attack for the guerilla group. The terrorists attacked killed around 300 people mainly targeting the Batthist and the Alawis in the city of Aleppo in the year 1979 and 1981 (Vignal, 2012)[52].

The seventeenth anniversary of the Baathist party on 8th march 1980 was accompanied by strikes and protests in the Syrian city which further turned into a battle ground with security forces in 1980. In this protests both secular and religious organizations were involved in which Muslim Brotherhood also played prominent role. The scenario of Aleppo city was changed by such events which were taken the form of wide scale crackdown. To control the situation the government had assigned huge military forces, ten thousands of troops laced with guns, grenades, tanks and helicopters in the city. Around hundreds of demonstrator lost their lives and thousands were arrested. The situation was under control by April 1980 (Gelbart, 2010)[53].

The Syrian dictator “Hafez Al Assad’ escaped death when he was attacked by series of gun shots and grenades thrown by the attackers while he was awaiting in Damascus diplomatic function on 26 June 1980, and further the government troops led the series of deadly retaliations against the attack. Around 1152 Islamic prisoners at Palmyra prison were massacred by government ruled by Alawis. Becoming a member of Muslim brotherhood was considered to be an offense and the person was succumbed to death with a grace period of one month to transform themselves to other group (Bahrampour, 2011)[54].

Eighty residents were pulled off from a block of flats after the soldiers stationed were attacked at Aleppo city in august 1980. The Hama riot occurred as a result in failure of the armed Islamic Guerillas attack on the village near Hama which was occupied by Alawites. As an action of revenge Special Forces of Syria and 47th Brigade were deployed in Hama and house to house search operation was launched where neighborhoods were sealed to avoid street fighting. Syrian army invaded the city and imposed curfew. Random selection of 350 male population who were over age of 14 who were executed and around 600 were injured in search operation (Mann, 2012)[55].

Later in the year 1980 around thousands of Muslim brothers turned themselves in to escape the death penalty imposed by the 7th July law. Most of the Muslim brothers were round age of 25 who belong to Damascus city and others were school teachers, engineers and professors. The active Muslim brotherhood was further involved in three car bomb attacks killing hundreds of civilians, government and military officials, in August, September and November 1981.

In Feb 1982 the occurrence of Hama Massacre had crushed the insurgency, in order to calm down the uprising of Muslim brotherhood against the Al-Assad’s government the Syrian Arab army and defense companies under the leadership of president Hafez al-Assad surrounded Hama city for 27 days (Ziadeh, 2013)[56]. The operation headed by commanding general Riffat –Al-Assad was successful in ending the Islamic and Muslim brotherhood protests against the government which was begun in 1976. Hama massacre led to mass killing of innocent civilians, military officers, insurgents, soldiers and local residents.

After the uprising of Hama, the insurrection of Islamists was broken and the Muslim brotherhood party is operating in exile and many other factions had surrendered and hided from the government. The Muslim brotherhood had parted in two factions after surrendering and giving up on armed struggle.

2.3.3 Second revolution 2011


With subsequent violent reaction by the Syrian state the civil uprising prior to the Syrian CivilWar was the early stage of protests – lasting from March to 28 July 2011.The uprising, initially evolved from minor protests demanding democratic reforms, beginning early January 2011 (Doran, 2011)[57].

The uprising was against the Ba’athist government of Bashar al-Assad, was marked by massive anti-government opposition demonstration meeting with military and police violence, brutal crackdown and massive arrests resulted in thousands of wounded and hundreds of causalities.

As Bassar al-Assad attempts to use censorship and pacify the protests with massive crackdown on one hand and concessions on the other hand but by the end of April it became clear that the situation in Syria was getting out of control and numerous troops were deployed by the Syrian government on the ground.

The platform for emergence of militant opposition movements was the phase of the civil uprising and the Syrian Army showed massive defections, resulting the civil uprising to an armed rebellion, and later a civil war. In July 29, 2011 the rebel Free Syrian Army was created (Lesch D. a., 2012)[58].

March 2011 unrest

The protests were relatively modest before the uprising in Syria which began in mid-March 2011; the wave of unrest was spreading across the Arab world. Syria for decades remained tranquil until March 2011, largely due to fear of police arresting critical citizens.

Major unrest began on 15 March in Damascus and Aleppo, and in the southern city of Darra. The protest has triggered on 6 March by the torture and incarceration of 15 young students who were arrested for writing anti-government graffiti in the city. The students were from prominent families. On 18 March, after the Friday prayers demonstrators clashed with local police and c confrontation escalated. The protestors gathered at the Omari Mosque were attacked by the security forces using water cannons and tear gas, followed by live fire, killing four (Sunstein, 2009)[59].

Ba’ath party headquarters and other public buildings were burned down by mob on 20 March. Security forces attacked the focal points of the demonstrations and firing live ammunition at crowds, the two day assault resulted in the deaths of fifteen protestors.

Minor protests also occurred in the other parts of the country. On 18 March, large scale protests broke out in cities including Banias, al-Hasakah, Damascus, Deir az-Zor, Darra and Hama. Six people were killed when police responded to the protestors with tear gas, cannons and beatings. Protestors demanded the abolition of Syria’s 48- year emergency law, an end to the pervasive corruption of the government and more freedoms along with the release of political prisoners.

After the Friday prayers on 25 March, mass protests emerged spread nationwide. A large number of people approximately ten thousand marched in Darra, and reportedly twenty people were killed by the security forces. The protests subsequently spread to the other cities of Syria too, killing at least 70 protestors in total (Hinnebusch, 2012)[60].


As the uprising began, the arrests that captured tens of thousands of people were waged by the Syrian government, according to activists and lawyers in Syria and human rights group. The Syrian government has allowed any of the nation’s 18 security forces and the police to detain a suspect without any warrant for eight days. Many of the detained experienced ill-treatment from the police as well as security forces (Bhardwaj, 2012)[61]. The arrest mainly focused on two groups-political activist and men and boys of the town from where the Syrian Army would start to besiege in April.

President Assad portrayed himself as the last guarantee for a secular form of government and characterized the opposition as the “takfiri” an armed terrorist group with extremist motives. A large number of security forces were deployed to prevent the movement of protests. Despite the crackdown, throughout the month of March widespread of protests continued in different cities of Syria.


The Syrian government during March and April, hoping to ease the unrest, offered policy changes and political reforms. In an attempt to reduce the corruption fired the governor of Darra and mandatory shortened army conscription was done by authorities. Announcement of release of political prisoners, raise the salaries of public sector workers and cut taxes, increase job opportunities and more press freedom was made by the government. But many of the reforms announced were not implemented (Dabashi, 2012)[62]. The government made some concessions to the minority people of Alawites sect and some to the majority Sunni. Citizenship was guaranteed to thousands of Syrian Kurds who were treated as foreigners. After weeks of debate and popular demands from the protestors was end to the nation’s state of emergency. On 21 April, Assad signed the decree, lifting state of emergency from Syria.

Arab League’s role in the Syrian Civil War

In March 2011, the killing of six civilians by the Syrian police led to protests which spread quickly throughout Syria. The government response grew increasingly cruel with the death toll reached to 150,000 and millions have become internally displaced. A hard stance against the Syrian regime of Bashar al-Assad was then unexpectedly taken by the Arab League (Pierret, 2013)[63].

The response of the government was violent. Strong criticism drew from the international community including Arab countries for mounting death tolls. The Syrian government was largely condemned by the Arab countries for using heavy weapons against its civilians during the month of Ramadan. Countries like Qatar and Saudi Arabia withdrew their ambassadors to Syria.

In August, the league condemned the Syrian government for nationwide uprisings repression and called for an immediate end to the uprising or violence. The league slapped sanctions on the regime when Syria continued to prevaricate

On 16th October in Egypt, a meeting was convened by Arab League Foreign Minister’s concerning the issues of Syria (Lynch, 2014)[64]. In November, the league demanded Assad to stop violence and demanded the initiation of talks between opposition and Syrian government. The League decided to set up a Syrian committee to look after or to guide the process in coordination between both the Syrian government and the opposition. The committee was headed by Qatar, which included delegates from Oman, Sudan, Egypt, Algeria and Arab League Chief Nabil El-Araby. The committee has conveyed its decision to Syria. The Arab League Action Plan was accepted in a subsequent meeting held on 30th October in Qatar and was signed by Syria on 2nd of November. The plan urged Syria to open dialogue with the opposition, halt the violence, and allow observers and international media into the country and free political prisoners (Fandy, 2007)[65].

Yet the Syrian government failed to open dialogue with the opposition within the Arab League’ prescribed timeline, which created intense debates about measures against the Assad’s regime with the suspension of Syria’s Arab League membership.


2.4 Reason for the revolution

Reason for the revolution of 1982

The town of Hama was a land of conservatism and of Muslim brothers. The reason behind the first revolution is political conflicts and a strong rivalry and opponent group against the Baathish rule were operative in Hama. The Hama city is occupied by Muslim majority and they belief in Allah. The main aim of Muslim brotherhood party was to shun the ruling Baathish government. Huge strikes and protests were organized against the government in Syrian cities especially in Hama. Theses strikes and protests were deformed by the military forces (Toft, 2007)[66]. The Baath party was formed in the year 1947 by Michel Aflaq who was a Christian, a Sunni Muslim (Salah al-din) and an Alawites (Zaki-al-Arsuzi)[67]. As per the congress the Baath party was revolutionary, socialist, populist and nationalist believing in unity and freedom in its homeland by the Arab nations. The theory based on class conflict was opposed by the party but was in favor of nationalization of industries, works unionization, land reforms, and also supported private property rights and private inheritance.

In the year 1954 the Baath party became the second largest party in the Syrian parliament after achieving and winning 22 seats out of 142 parliamentary seats in the Syrian election. The Sunni Islamists and the Muslim brotherhood led to disturbance in the Syrian cities, their primary motive is to prioritize the Muslim community and ruling the society and government with Muslim beliefs, ideologies and Islamic laws (Lischer, 2006)[68]. The Islamic rival movement is highlighted by the literalism, moral conservatism and an initiative to inculcate Islamic norms and values at each and every sphere of life. The Islamism favoring the restructuring of government and society according to the Islamic law and posing every version of Islamic law over the society. The reason behind the uprising of Islam in Syria is to demolish the Baath party ruling government and to establish new Islamic government. The civilians and many military personnel’s were killed and assassinated in the protests by the Islamists.

Further national crisis emerged with the formation of new constitution by Al –Assad in the year 1973 who laid emphasis on the selection of non-Muslim as the president of Syria leading to large scale demonstrations, protests and riots organized by Muslim brotherhood and Ulama in the cities of Hama, Homs and Aleppo (Hokayem, 2013)[69]. Muslim brotherhood further labeled Assad as the enemy of Allah and called for a holy war jihad against his rule to defend the Muslims rights and beliefs.

In 1976 the Syrian regime in order to rule and control Lebanon the Syrian occupation of Lebanon started, as a result of which thousands of Syrian officers, government workers, professional, doctors, lecturers, teachers got assassinated, and major victims killed were Alawis which was interpreted as that particular community was targeted by the assassins. The Muslim brotherhood was held responsible for such mass killing of Alawis as they considered Alawis to be a non-Muslim. Further it was discovered that the Iraqi government ruled by saddam Hussein had offered military and logistical support to the brotherhood (Byman, 2008)[70].

The massacre of Aleppo Artillery School was massacre of the army cadets of Syria done by the Muslim brotherhood which was the testimony of islamists uprising in Syria in the year 1976-82.On June 1979 an on duty officer Ibrahim-el-Yusuf and Syrian Muslim brotherhood members identifying themselves as fighting vanguards and its leader Adnan uqla called an urgent meeting with the alawites cadet in the school mess hall and open fired with grenades and automatic weapons at the unarmed cadets leading to 83 death tolls. This massacre led to the full-fledged uprising of the Syrian Muslim brotherhood as urban warfare against the ruling Alawites. The main target of the guerilla attacks were the Baath party, military posts, police, barracks, factories.


The city was exploded with violence in November 1979, with the arrest of Shaykh Zan Al-Din the leading voice of Islamists and a leader at the local mosque who recites the prayers in the great mosque of Aleppo (Wood E. J., 2008)[71]. Following the arrests violent activities, demonstrations, strikes, protests, boycotts and increased attacks on baath party officials took place. The biggest threat to the state was Islamic opposition as they were highly organized and best armed parties.

This massacre was responded by the Syrian government and an estimated 15 prisoners were sentenced to death who belonged to “Islamic resistance movement’ and were accused of being agents of Iraq. Over 300 people were killed in terrorists attack at the Aleppo city also many Islamic clergy who had criticized for the murders were also killed. One of the clergy Shaykh Muhammad al-Shami was killed in the violent act at his own mosque, the Sulaymania in the year 1980 (Landis, 2012)[72].

Muslim brotherhood along with many religious and secular parties had paralyzed the city of Aleppo with strikes, riots, terrorists attack to disturb the seventeenth anniversary celebration of Ba’ atheist coup in 8th march 1980.the protests was highly responded by the government with military troops laced with grenades, tanks and helicopters, the operation killed hundreds of demonstrators and protestors leading to the shunning of such uprising.

In June 26 1980 the Muslim brotherhood had made a conspiracy against Syrian dictator Hafez-al-Assad and tried to kill him by throwing two grenades and series of firing gun shots on him while he waited for a diplomatic function in Damascus (Lyme, 2012)[73]. This attack was the scope of Islamists uprising in Syria. Further the attack led to the Tadmor prison massacre the very next day Tadmor is a place 200km north east of Damascus. Tadmor prison is well known for its torture, harsh conditions, and extensive abuse of human rights. Under the order of Assad at dawn around thousand of Syrian prisoners were killed in the dormitories. Later the membership of Muslim brotherhood was considered a punishable offence of death and people are told to transform themselves within a grace period of less than a month (Mazaheri, 2010)[74]. After a failed terrorist attack at the soldiers in Aleppo the army forced around 80 residents out from their homes at flat located near Aleppo.

In the year 1981 the failed attack at the Alawites village check point near Hama by the armed Islamists guerilla groups led to the rise of Hama Massacre. In counter attack the government launched search operations and deployed units of Syrian forces and 47th brigade at the city of Hama and conducted house-to house search, sealed the neighborhood to avoid street fighting. City was banned and curfew was imposed by the Syrian army who entered the city and executed around 350 residents on a random basis selection of male population above the age of 14 and caused injury to around 600 civilians (Levitt, 2010)[75].

In order to escape death penalty many Muslim students, professors, teachers turned themselves to other group. In 1981 the Muslim brotherhood again laid to terror activities by launching three car bomb attack, killing thousands of innocent people and civilians as per the official press. The uprising was mainly shunned by the bloody Hama Massacre in 1982 where thousands of civilians and innocent people were killed. On 2nd February, 1982 the Muslim brotherhood led violent revolt in Hama and rapidly took the control of the city which was counter attacked by the military forces and bombing at Hama shook the city throughout the month (McLean, 2010)[76]. The Hama event led to demolishing of brotherhood party and militant Islamic movement as a political force in Syria. But still the brotherhood is operating in exile.

Reason for the revolution of 2011

Before the rise of Syrian civil war the protests led to the civil uprising accompanied by violent reactions by the state of Syria. Initially the uprising was demanding democratic reforms which were formed by minor protests in January 2011.further the uprising took the form of violent protests, demonstrations against the Ba’athist government of Bashar al-Assad marches, crackdown leading to thousands of causalities and death tolls (Osgood, 2006)[77]. The Bashar government failed to calm down the massive protests with brutal crackdown using concessions and censorships the situation was out of control as a result various troops were deployed by the Syrian government to control the situation.

The civil uprising era led the grounds for the emergence of massive defections and militant opposition movements from the Syrian army, which slowly rose to conflict from civil uprising to an armed rebellion and then turned to civil war.

Before the Syrian uprising there were modest protests considering the chaotic situation in the Arab world. Until March 2011, Syria remained calm due to the fear of police arresting critical citizens.

The major chaotic situation and unrest aroused from 15th March 2011 when fifteen young students belonging to prominent families were arrested for writing antigovernment graffiti in the city of Aleppo and Damascus and southern city of Daraa (Sambanis, 2009)[78]. The crowd of protestors gathered at Omari Mosque was deformed by the police forces using tear gas, water cannons and live firing taking 4 death tolls on 18th march 2011. The protestors demanded for the release of political prisoners, ending the government corruption, abolition of emergency law in Syria which is 48 years old and more freedom. Further on 20th march the protestors set the Baath party headquarters to fire and burned many public buildings. In revenge action fifteen protestors were killed and live firing was conducted on the crowd.

On 25th march 2011 the massive protests and March took place against the government where lakhs of people participated after the Friday prayers in the Daraa city and the protests spread like wild fire in other Syrian cities like Homs, Jasim, Aleppo and Latakia (Suresh, 2015)[79].

After numerous attempts and arrests the uprising continued. Assad government had labeled many protestors as terrorists and arrested human rights campaigners, political dissidents, political leaders and various activists were also arrested.


2.5 Peace Agreement

The Syrian peace process is the initiative taken by the Arab League to resolve the Syrian Civil War which has ravaged in Syria in 2011and has spilled beyond. The peace process was moderated by the Arab League, UN, Russia and Western Powers. The representatives were from the negotiation parties of the Syrian Government and Syrian Opposition who tried to end the conflict.

In late 2011, the efforts to design a solution to the uprising began when the Arab League took two initiatives but that was without success. In January 2012 in Russia and in 2013 a suggested talk was in between the Syrian government and the opposition held in Moscow (Souleimanov, 2014)[80]. In March to May 2012, Kofi Annan coordinated a plan which had a hope on the United Nations and the Arab League.

Geneva II Conference on Syria, took place in January and February 2014, organized by Lakhdar Brahimi, then UN representative or envoy to Syria. Further talks started in Vienna on 30th October 2015, involving officials from US, Russia, China, and the EU and from various regions of the world like Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Egypt and Iran for the first time.

On September 15th, 2015 the large group of Syrian rebel factions issued a statement about the Syrian peace process initiated by United Nation envoy Staffan de Mistura.de Mistura remained hopeful that the scheme of the working group could pave the way for transition talk in the future. In August 17th in Presidential Statement, the council approved and endorsed the plan (Ravid, 2008)[81].

Kofi Annan Peace plan, 2012

Kofi Annan, envoy for the UN and the Arab League, has launched a peace plan in March 2012, which intended to commit cease fire between both Syrian government and the Opposition. On 12th April, after Annan assumed that both the parties had agreed to a cease fire but on 1st May U.N. acknowledged that both the parties of the rebel were violating it (Weiss, 2014)[82].

Geneva I, June 2012

On June 30th 2012, an “action group” conference referred to as Geneva I Conferenceon Syria, commenced by the United Nations peace envoy to Syria, Kofi Annan and attended by Hillary Clinton, U.S. Secretary of State representative of China, Russian Foreign Ministry Lavrov, British Foreign Secretary Hague and Kofi Annan. The conference agreed a communiqué issued by Mr. Annan on the need for a “full executive powers for the transitional government body” that could include members of opposition party and the members of present Syrian government. According to William Hague, the five permanent members of the UN Security Council-Russia, US, China, UK and France agreed and supported Mr. Annan’s effort (Momani, 2007)[83].

16th Summit of the non-Aligned Movement

The 16th Summit of the Non-Aligned Movement held in Tehran from 26th to 31st August 2102, attended by leaders of 120 countries and Iran, a new peace resolution was drawn by Iran aiming to resolve the Syrian Civil War. But unfortunately the consensus did not reach between leaders.

Attempts made for cease fire during Eid al –Adah, September 2012

On September 1, 2012 Lakhdar Brahimi was appointed as the new UN Arab League special representative for Syria. He appealed to both the Syrian government and the rebel leaders to stop massacre during the Islamic festival of Eid al-Adah, which fell in the month of October 26, 2012.Most of the opposition and government agreed to his appeal (Shlaim, Israel and Palestine: Reappraisals, revisions, refutations., 2009). This might have stopped for very short, but later on both the parties accused each other of not having stopped violence (Gifkins, 2012)[84].

Geneva II, 2014

Geneva II conference was a United Nations supported international peace conference to discuss together about a transitional government for the opposition and the Syrian government. Lakhdar Brahimi tried to pursue the conference on 22nd January to 31st January 2014, in close connection with Russia and US, but no agreement was reached (Shagabutdinova, 2007)[85].

Syria Peace Talk in Vienna

In order to devise a way for ending the Syrian conflict, on October 23rd, 2015 the Foreign Ministers of the Unite States, Saudi Arabia, Russia and Turkey met and communicated in Vienna, Austria. Again on 30th October, 2015, the first round talks for peace of Syria held in Vienna among foreign ministers of 20 countries. In the second round talks in Vienna an agreement was produced in need of negotiation between Syrian government and the opposition under UN auspices with a target date 1st January, 2016.Syrian government president Assad did not want to negotiate with “foreign terrorist.” (Rabinovich, 2008)[86]On 15 December, after John Kerry visited Moscow and met Russian counterpart Lavrov and Vladimir Putin, an announcement was made that on 18th December 2015, world powers to meet in New York for passing a resolution on Syria peace process.

The UN Security Council, on 18th December 2015, to overcome the gridlock on the uprising of Syria that had continued since 2011, has unanimously passed the resolution 2254(2015), endorsing the International Syria Support Group’s transitional plan for formal talks and unity in government within a timetable set for six months, UN special envoy for Syria Staffan de Mistura was in charge of organizing Syria talks. No mention was made for the role of Syrian President Bashar Assad in future as major powers remained divided that who should represent the Syrian opposition (Shlaim, Israel and Palestine: Reappraisals, revisions, refutations. , 2009)[87].

Cessation and Halting of Hostilities (27 February 2016)

The International Syria Support Group (ISSG) on 12th February 2016 established a cease fire talk under UN, co-chaired by the United States and the Russia, and issued a joint communiqué saying “An ISSG task force will elaborate modalities for a nationwide cessation of hostilities within one week.” As the announcement was done by the foreign ministers of Russia and US, as co-chairs of ISSG, the deal set out the terms for a cessation of hostilities in Syria. On February 27, 2016 the US and Russia proposed that the cessation of hostilities commence at (00:00) Damascus time (Iltis, 2016)[88].

The accord was hailed as a major step towards bringing peace to Syria; this civil war has killed thousands and fled many as refugees into other nations. The process is designed to end the nation’s civil war and giving a new government to its people in Syria.


2.5.1 Arab League peace plans for Syria

The Arab League in November 2011 to January 2012, tried twice to mediate in the Syrian Civil War but without success.

First Attempt

On 2nd November 2011, the Syrian government settled to an peace plan by the Arab League, that in the peaceful demonstration army would not be deployed in the violent crackdowns, all political prisoners to be released, tanks would be withdrawn from cities, foreign media and press allowed to monitor the situation and a dialogue with the opposition should began within two weeks. But when on 6th November, 23 demonstrators were killed; this was first breach of promise by Syria (Wilson, 2012)[89].

Since 2nd November, Syrian opposition groups counted death of 300 demonstrators till 12th and 13th November, the League threatened for suspension of Syria’s membership from the League in case they would not implement the peace plan by 16th November. And on 16th November the Arab League indeed suspended the membership (Sen, 2013)[90].

Second Attempt

The Arab League peace plan was to end the more than seven months of bloodshed and opening dialogues or talks with the opposition on ways to move the country toward democracy. But with the death of 34 people killed in the central province of Homs and Hamas, it became unclear whether the deal would stop the escalating violence.

Within two weeks Syrian government was supposed to begin the talk with its opponents by accepting the peace plan of the Arab League. But they could not keep their promise and bloodshed continued (Khodadady, 2014)[91].

On 26th December, fifty Arab League monitors began arriving in Syria, to see what’s happening. But following weeks, the League mission was criticized as Damascus did not keep its promise. In January 2012, the League decided to extend its mission by adding more members to it and provide them with more resource. On January 22nd, the decision provoked Saudi Arabia to withdraw its monitors from the League Mission as the presence of monitors communicated legitimacy to the violent actions of the Syrian army, and call on China, Russia, the US, Europe and the Islamic states, for adhering the Arab peace plan on Syria (Adami, 2013)[92].

Around January 23rd and 24th, Assad wasted another peace plan to prevent the bloodshed and violence. The Gulf States Qatar, Oman, Kuwait, Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates decided that the violence had not abated, and therefore the League Observer Mission for peace was inadequate and decided to withdraw their monitors from Syria. On 27th January, Mustafa al-Dabi, the head of the League Mission, warned that recently the violence intensified more in recent days in Syria. On 28th January 2012, the Arab League Mission suspended monitoring mission as the violence was worsening (Marauhn, 2012)[93].

Freedom of Movement

The Syrian government‘s agreement to the Arab plan was welcomed by the Arab League, as they have agreed to the League’s exact implementation of the articles in the plan. Under the agreement, immediate cease of violence and withdraw of the army from the cities, freedom of political prisoners, allowing foreign media and representatives of right group and Arab League can move freely in Syria. This acceptance of agreement done by the Syrian government brought some sigh of hope among the leaders of some countries (ÖZDEN, 2016)[94].

The UN-Arab League special envoy to Syria, Kofi Annan, proposed six-point peace plan in an attempt to end the conflict arising in the Syrian regime. The plan was to bring a cease fire between the Syrian government and the opposition and engage in a dialogue. At the behest of China and Russia, the plan does not call for President Bashar al-Assad’s resignation. However, Russia and china both agreed to support the peace process. The peace process brought down by Kofi Annan has a framework for stopping the violence ,initiating a transition in the country and initiating greater humanitarian access for the people of Syria (Meskela, 2013)[95].

To hammer out their objectives and to strengthen the unity, members of the Syrian opposition met in Istanbul including the Syrian National Council. Bassam Jaara, member of the council, called all the parties involved in the transition peace process to sign the declaration which will set Syria’s new identity giving a democratic, civil, plural and guarantees the equality of all the people of Syria after the fall of Assads government.

The violence continued despite the Syrian regime accepted the peace plan. Local Coordination committees and activist monitors the violence counting the deaths and destructions which occurred around the cities of Damascus, Hama and Dier Ezzor in the east (Negrón-Gonzales, 2015)[96].

The Arab League condemned the Syrian government for breaking its deal and promised to give material and political support to the opposition. China meanwhile said Syria’s problem needed to be resolved diplomatic means.

The Arab League resolution now contains toughest decision on Syria and shows the extent of the Syrian regime’s isolation. The League mission was suspended early due to the criticism that it was ineffective during the escalating violence. A demand by Syria was rejected by the Arab League to alter its plan for ending its arising conflict, which lead to death of thousands. The league has passed a deadline overnight abating the violence without any crackdown (Kabbara, 2015)[97].

The Arab League plan was the best hope to resolve the conflict peacefully have crashed in flames.


2.6 Was it the failure of Syria to adhere to the peace plan rather than the human rights violations that led to sanctions


There were numerous incidence of human rights violation in the Syrian war with numerous and serious outcomes which described that the war was a complete negligence and lack of adherence on the part of Syria to the international law norms and the parties continued adhering to violence and mass sufferings. On 2015 around lakhs of innocent civilians were killed and half of the population left their homes and led a life of refugees (de Jonge Oudraat, 2010)[98].

The United Nations and human rights organizations had developed that the Syrian government and the rebels had violated the human rights and the vast majority was abused by the government of Syria. The further investigation of the United Nations commission 9 intentional mass killings was taken place in the year 2012 to mid July 2013 identifying the culprit was Syrian government in 8 cases of human rights abuse.

The Assad regime was accused of conducting mass killing of civilians using chemical weapons which contained chlorine gas and organized torture and violent activities and killings (Gottemoeller, 2007)[99]. The Assad was also held responsible for disproportionate and indiscriminate bombarding and shelling to create disturbance and mass killings leading to terror. The free Syrian Army conducted war crimes and other rebel activities like hiring child as soldiers, bombarding civilian areas, taking hostages and murdering the religious minorities’ members and extensive use of poison gas. Also the rebel groups had used sarin gas which was a nerve agent as a weapon against the Syrian government. The continuous breach of the peace plans by the Syrian government was the primary reason of sanction in Syria by Arab league.

The peace initiatives plan was led by the League of Arab States, the UN special envoy on Syria, Russia and western powers. The peace plans involved the Ba’athist Government and the Syrian opposition as the negotiating party to end the conflict (Habibi, 2012)[100].

The first peace agreement led on November 2, 2011 the Syrian government agreed to withdraw the deployed army and military in the violent crack down against the peaceful demonstrators, tanks will be withdrawn, agreed to release political prisoners, within two weeks dialogue with the opposition begun, but the first breach of peace plan was done on Syrian government part was killing of 23 demonstrators on 6th November. Since 2nd November 2011, till 12th 13th November around 300 demonstrators were assassinated by the Syrian opposition and other opponents against government which led to the suspension of Syrian membership from Arab league on 16th November (Eriksson, 2011)[101].

The second attempt of peace plan in Syria was signed and agreed by the government on 9th November 2011, which was to be monitored by the Arab league monitors. The mission of Arab league was to watch the progress of Syrian withdrawing troops from protest areas, releasing political prisoners and negotiating with the decedents, in order to resolve the Syrian crisis. The opposition accused Arab league monitor mission as a failure as the violence continued and causalities rose in the cities of Syria Inspite of the continuous observation by the Arab league monitors who included the membership of Russia, Europe, U.S., China and Islamic states (Escribà‐Folch, 2010)[102]. The situation of Syria went out of control as a result the monitoring mission of Arab league was forced to be withdrawn.

The Russian government supported the Syrian government since the start of Syrian crisis in 2011 since 2015. Russian provided military aid, politically and directly military involvement. Russian being a permanent member of the UN Security Council continuously vetoed the draft resolutions of western sponsored in the United Nation Security Council which demanded the resignation of Syrian president Bashar Assad and led the possibility of UN sanctions against Bashar government. The United Nations appointed Kofi Annan as joint special envoy for the implementation of peace plan in Syria in the year march 2012 which aimed getting commitments for the Syrian government and the opposition to a cease fire and held discussions with the oppositions with regard to their aspirations and concerns, but soon it was revealed that both the parties are continuously violating the law (Fearon J. D., 2007)[103].

To strengthen the objectives and inculcate peace plans the members of Syrian opposition met in Istanbul which included the Syrian National Council. To set new identity for Syria as a democratic, civil, plural , granting equality to the population of Syria after the fall of Assad regime all the party member were called by Bassam Jaara member of the Syrian National Council to sign the declaration (Hafner-Burton, 2008)[104].

Since there was no sign of the Syrian conflict after the four years, the civil war has dragged on its violence has become more systematic, widespread and extreme. The uprising of war has also become more threatening the peace, intractable and the entire Middle East stability. The consequences are already devastating for neighboring Iraq and pose an enduring threat to Lebanon, Turkey and Jordan.

On 2005, the United Nations World Summit adopted the global commitment Responsibility to Protect (R2P), discourse to respond in case of mass atrocity crimes prevalent in Syria. On 2011, in Libya UN Security Council-mandated intervention despite the acrimonious debate that regional organizations, individual states and UN agencies have struggled for developing means and ways of maintaining their responsibility for protecting the people of Syria (Yildiz, 2007). The investigation by the United Nations Human Rights and a Joint Monitoring Mission by the Arab League’s deployed during 2012 failed to censure atrocities committed by government forces and armed rebel group. Though is a demonstration of international efforts to stop or confront atrocities in Syria, which was not enough (Hannon, 2013)[105].

It was not the failure of Responsibility to Protect (R2P), to end the atrocities and to protect the civilians of Syria but of the imperfection on the implementation the responsibility to protect the people of Syria lies with the body mandated by the 193 members of the United Nations with the responsibility of maintaining security and peace in Syria (Peksen, 2009)[106].

Five distinguishable phases of rebel and armed conflict in Syria so far took place. The first one started on March 2011 until the mid of the year, characterized by asymmetrical violence in the form of revolution against the government. The second phase was on the second half of the year 2011, shocked by the resilience of the opposition, with their continuous protest and the government adjusted its strategy. The third phase was in early 2012, with assault and siege on the city of Homs. By early 2013, the conflict entered its fourth phase as the civil war has reached the military stalemate (Solberg-Henriet, 2015)[107]. And now it’s the fifth phase, the civil war has fractured Syria and divides the country into patchwork of different competing military zones.

In2012, President Assad agreed to six-point plan proposed by UN-Arab League envoy, Kofi Annan, which included implementing a ceasefire, release of political prisoners, withdraw of military and tanks etc. However security forces still continued with their atrocities.

President Assads atrocities and brutal dictatorship preoccupied the world with the stopping the slaughter of civilians of Syria. The leading western countries and several Arab states imposed efforts to curb the government’s atrocities. The international community started pressing the Syrian rebels to respect rights. The Saudi Arabia and Qatar gave out weapons without excluding forces that violates the law of war (Bromley, 2012)[108].

Human Rights urged the rebels with a image for their country that it has a domicile for all Syrians and subscribed the code of conduct to reinforce their forces. The transition from revolution to respect its democracy is the foremost task of all, for the country where changes are going on.

Inspite of continuous agreement and measures adopted by Arab League and accepted by the Syrian government and opposition to combat the violence and initiate peace plans in Syria the plan was not a success. As the Syrian government and the opposition were continuously violating the norms and led to mass sufferings of innocent civilians and disturbed the city of Syria with never ending riots, terrorists attacks, demonstrations, protests, crackdown which forced the members of Arab league to set economic sanctions against Syria (Mostafiz, 2013)[109].

The Arab league has imposed a battery of economic sanctions which were meant to serve most of the investment and trade from the Arab world. This measure was adopted to spread peace in Syria and stop the bloody crackdown on the civilians and dissidents which was the another harsh step of sanction against Syria as it was already suffering sanctions from United States and European Union. The Syrian sanctions was supported by 19 member states meeting in Cairo, who reflected signs of frustration against the Damascus government who violated the peace agreement norms which was signed and accepted by Damascus government three weeks ago as the protests and violence still continued at an alarming rate.


The immediate reaction of Syria against the peace plan initiative was it refused the intervention of Arab monitors to observe the implication of the peace plan which ended the military crackdown leading to death toll of 3500 innocent people. The main aim of the sanction was not changing the regime but to stop the violence and sufferings of the Syrians and force Syria to abide by the peace plan of Arab league. The league is trying its best to provide political solutions to Syria but it is the failure of Syria to maintain peace and involved in repeated haggling and maneuvering. The sanction included travel ban against the rank of senior officials, transactions with central bank of Syria is banned; the Syrian government assets in Arab countries are freezed, and withdrawing of all commercial exchanges done with the Syrian government (Mohamedou, 2016)[110]. The sanction was also supported by turkey as the Arab league and turkey cannot remain silent on the assassinations and killing of the civilians and increasing torcher of the Syrian regime against innocent people.




Chapter Three: Concepts of Economic Sanctions under the Arab League (40 pages)

Section One: Overview of the Sanctions Under the Arab League

Definition of Economic Sanctions and type of Economic Sanctions

  • Conditions for Imposing Economic Sanctions
  • History (How many times the AL make Sanctions, put them in table) include Member and none member. And why AL made the ES because of
    • Political Issues (Israel, USA, Canada, Egypt, Iraq, Hezbollah)
      1. AL informs a highly political and unpredictable use of economic sanctions
    • Human Rights Issues (Libya, Syria)

Section Two: Regime of Economic Sanctions under the Arab League

  • Legality of sanction based on the Arab League Charter
  • Legality of sanction based on the EU charter (comparative)
  • Legality of sanction based on the UN charter article 7. Why Russia and China used the Veto? Because they have interest in Syria or they don’t respect international law.

Section Three: Regime of Sanctions for Human Rights Violations

  • Legality of Sanctions based on the Arab League Human Rights Violations.
  • Legality of Sanctions based on the EU Human Rights Violations.
  • Legality of Sanctions based on the UN Human Rights Violations.
    • What kind of crime the government of Syria has done? Check UN human rights report (//www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/IICISyria/Pages/IndependentInternationalCommission.aspx) . Can the international communities take president of Syria to ICJ?


Section Four: Gup should be fill (Interviews and questioner or Comparative with EU )

  • Where is the Gup (AL impose economic sanction, but the Enforcement is very week, and there is no monitor for the banks to look for the transactions?
  • Gup should be filled

First gup. what should AL do to inforce ES? Is there any idea to inforce ES? How the AL monitor the transaction for the state has been sanctioned? Do the AL have legitimacy to inforce ES? Compare with EU

Second gup. For breaking embargo, the charter doesn’t address any punishment. Compare with EU


Section Five: Conclusion

Note: Section Four, we are going to make the questions and I’ll show the professor these questions, if he satisfied with them, then I’ll travel to Egypt to do interviews there with AL members, and will write the answer later. The Question will focus on enforcing economic sanction.




3.0 Chapter Three: Concepts of Economic Sanctions under the Arab League

3.1 Chapter Introduction




The Arab League was formed post the World War II, have successfully completed 68 years and is the oldest organization in the entire Arab region. The formation of the League was an important international event as it is influential in the dynamics of regional relations that comprised of an embodiment of Arab states only. The organization became institutionalized throughout the Arab region The primary purpose behind such sanctions was to inspire member states to follow the Arab League Charter and not to repeat any kind of violation in the future. The progress of the Arab League has been marked by several stages of historical challenges as faced in the Arab region. The decolonization of the Arab states was an effective tool that facilitated Arab unification, hence nationalism and socialism, Egypt played an integral role in such step. This period was marked by no Islamic slogans as the League at that time predominantly reflected interests of the Arab’s dominant countries of Egypt, Syria and Iraq (Neo, Retrieved on 10th September, 2016)[111].

The League acted as the chief instrument for Arab national politics, that helped strengthen relations among member countries in fields of finance, economics, commerce, cultural and other areas. The League has 19 specialized inter-Arab organizations that manage economic activity amongst Arab states. Though several agreements have been formed but none have been fully implemented in practice, which has further led to the ineffectiveness of the intra-Arab economic organizations. The primary reason attributed to the above cause was the Arab world’s political disunity, due to ambitious Arab leaders, most important economic as well as political issues were overlooked. This led to further non-uniformity of economic structures, and depression in the weak economies of the Arab countries with strong dependence on global markets. Arab League further failed to resolve the Palestinian problem, Arab-Israel wars and increasing conflicts amongst individual states. Hence though the League implemented several sanctions in its regime, the effectiveness of such implementation is questionable.

3.2 Overview of the Sanctions Under the Arab League

3.2.1 Conditions for Imposing Economic Sanctions


The League of Arab States imposes sanctions against any member country or foreign country, in case of violation of the rules of the Charter. The Charter of the League lays down that the Council reserves the right to sanction member states in case of violation of the provisions in the Charter, in case of;

  • Aggression or threat of aggression against another State member : Article 5 and 6 of Arab League Charter lays down that member states need to maintain peace and harmony in the region for economic and prospect of the Arab states. The League was made to promote economic, social and communal prosperity amongst Arab states and each member holds equal rights in number of votes to express any area of concern. In case a member fails to abide by the Article of the Charter then the League reserves the right to implement any sanction or boycott from such a member state till such time the member state resolves its conflict(Hufbauer, 2007)[112].
  • Human rights violations : The League of Arab States has several divisional organizations that promote welfare of the community in the Arab states. The League also establishes to maintain rights of children and women in the states. If any state fails to abide by such laws and causes human right violation of any kind as in case of Iraq invading Kuwait, the League and its Council can enforce sanction against such a member state and can also suspend membership.
  • Other political issues : In case a member state supports any terrorisms activities such as Hezbollah, then the League preserves the right to implement sanction against such a member state.

In case of evading any of the clause of the Charter of the League, then it can implement sanctions of three types. The types of sanctions that can be applied by the League are;

  • Politico-diplomatic sanctions : In case of political-diplomatic sanctions, the League removes or reduces diplomatic ties with the state.
  • Military sanctions : In case of military sanctions, the League stops any military intervention or arms embargoes in the state. Hence in case of emergency or attack by a foreign country, the member state cannot appeal to the League for any kind of military assistance.
  • Economic sanctions : When Arab League imposes an economic sanction against a member state, then it stops all financial and banking transactions with that member state(Al-Qahtani, 2006)[113].

In case of economic sanction, the League applies three types of sanctions as;

  • Financial Sanctions
  • Freezing bank accounts for the higher state officials : In Syria Bashar Al-Assad and Ali Abdullah Saleh’s bank account had been freezed.
  • Restrictions on transactions : There was a major restriction on transaction of Syria and Iraq following economic sanction.
  • Business Sanctions
  • Bans on trade: export & import of certain goods as food, medicine, clothes, and oil;
  • Naval blockade : Bans on Maritime trade
  • Siege of air and ground transportation

The sanctions had however certain problems regarding their successful implementation, the regime of sanctions made by the League highlighted the following problems (Hoekman B. &., 2010)[114];

  • The AL Charter provisions are silent about all the above types of sanctions.
  • The Council adopts sanctions at its discretion;
  • Meaning, there is no “real” legal basis for adoption of sanctions;
  • Articles 5-7 of AL Charter is ambiguous on regime of sanctions;
  • There is double standard in adopting sanctions (e.g: Syria)

Enforcement Mechanisms of Sanctions

  • Lack of enforcement mechanisms of sanctions;
  • Each State member should enforce the Council’s sanctions based on its own domestic laws (Art. 7 of AL Charter):
    • State breaking embargo imposed on the violating-State;
    • Private actor (bank) collaborating with the violating State. History (write all the sanctions were imposed by the AL , and mention that if the sanctions were successful or not. this is Empirical study)

Economic sanctions have been imposed by world organizations as United Nations in several instances to curb and resolve conflicts, regional organizations have also adopted economic sanctions as their policies. Arab League has implemented economic sanction policy against Israel along with Organization of Arab Oil Exporting Countries. OAPEC on 20 October 1974, imposed embargo on oil exports to several countries, especially to United States, due to its support to Israel October War (Raphaeli, 2007)[115]. The embargo diverted oil of companies from OAPEC companies to other countries, whereas non-OAPEC companies were allowed to export oil to U.S. The OAPEC companies in order to affect United Sates, adopted a policy to reduce overall oil exports to other countries as well to affect U.S., which led to severe economic crisis in the U.S. Similarly, Arab League adopted a series of policies in order to effect changes in Israel policies and later imposed sanctions against Syria. The League adopted a total embargo on exports to Israel but later realized that the country could get the necessary supplies easily from neighboring countries, Iran and also redirect its exports through other countries. In order to restrict Israel trade, the League adopted blacklisting of companies which had presence in Israel. The foreign companies that were at that time operational in the League also abided to follow such principle of blacklisting. But this effort by the League was declared illegal by the U.S., as there were absence of high-profile U.S. companies that had almost nil presence in Arab countries, as Coca-Cola and Ford (Roach, 2014)[116].

The economic sanctions was seen to be a continuation of the efforts of Arab-nations to sanction Israel, which later turned into boycott that started in the 1940s. The boycott was deemed to bring about economic collapse in Israel, it was extended by banning direct trade of Arab and foreign companies with Israel. There was tremendous pressure to blacklists foreign companies that maintained commercial ties with Israel, and also banned Arabs to deal with such blacklisted companies. The boycott further included severing of all overland and pipeline transport systems to Israel. The ban extended to exporting and importing any goods from raw materials to finished products dealing with Israel. The most important blockade included the Suez Canal to Israel shipping of cargo and related materials. The enforcement mechanism of the League was not rigorous and the decision making system of the League was not consistent. Criticism has marked that Arab League’s boycott of Israel has backfired by benefitting Israel (Jreisat, 2006)[117]. The boycott led to spur of Israel industry, which started producing a wide range of materials from sophisticated weapons to clothing and many more, enhancing their own markets.

The second economic sanction made by League was against Syria, against its repeated failure to adhere to peace. The severe political uprising in Syria followed by armed conflict led to disturbance in the region and severe humanitarian crisis. The power revolt and protests against Ba’athist government led to a series of armed conflicts which military and government forces failed to suppress (Peterson, 2011)[118]. The League condemned every effort of the member state and as a last resort implemented an economic sanction but cutting off major transactions with the country. Political Issues (Mention all these sanctions in details because they are political Issues, Israel, Egypt, USA, Canada and Iraq)

The League of Arab States have maintained regular meetings and conduct for maintaining and abiding by the basic principles for which it had been established. But the implementation of sanctions has been considered under the political interests of various member countries. Critics of the League and its Charter have noted that various powerful and influential member states have implied policies which have been beneficial to them and in their interests, thus widening the gap. The late 1960s have seen the concept of Islamic unity gained immense importance as initiated by Saudi Arabia and it further encouraged the goal of Arab unity (Allen, 2008)[119]. The spilt of the Arab world was further triggered by the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC). The Arab League has not been effective in resolving conflicts and influencing situations in the Arab world. The mutual military obligations amongst the member states also proved immensely ineffective as demonstrated by 1990-1191 Persian Gulf crisis as Iraq attacked Kuwait.

From the year 1990 intraregional problems in the Arab countries worsened further amongst Arab member states. As Palestinian Gulf monarchies came into political power, the League’s role in the intraregional politics as well as in international politics diminished. The League was unable to prove its position and communicate with the U.S. following the later capturing of Iraq in the year 2003, hence it was incapable to demonstrate a pan-Arab position. Due to the rising unimportance of the League there was a tremendous pressure from its members especially Libyan leader Mohammar Gadhafi, who wanted serious amendments to be made in the Charter of the Organization allowing for more enforceability (Bakan, 2009)[120]. The Libyan leader threatened to withdraw from the League and form an African Union in case the Arab League was incapable of demonstrating powers necessary in the region.

Arab League in its progress have been encountering several problems and challenges but then it still strictly wants to adhere to the norms as laid down in the Charter for the League. The Charter of the League promoted respect towards the members existing governments, thus reducing interferences in internal matters of member states, the Charter also provides for peaceful resolution of conflicts in the League. In spite of the ambivalent attitude of the League, the member states have repeatedly violated and disputed key issues against the interests of the League as well as against the United Nations (Takeyh, 2006)[121].

The League was able to demonstrate itself as a powerful regional organization during the Arab Spring by influencing decision in the region. But, the League deployed the mechanism in order to influence situation, has been deeply criticized and also its effects which had far stretched effects beyond Arab region. The League’s decision in Libya war was totally unprecedented and the organization was transformed into an individual state for attaining this. The League implemented an isolated regime with international intervention in the area. Libyan leaders were accused of retaliation against armed demonstrators during the regime. However, such actions in other member states have previously been accepted by the Arab League. The League further did not suspend Iraq that had attacked and occupied Kuwait, exposing violence to the country and attacking civilians in 1990 (Sela, 2012)[122]. In 1979 Egypt’s membership was suspended following, the country betraying interests of the Arab states.

The League in case of Libya placed it at the discretion of NATO and abandoned every effort to resolve its crisis situation by peaceful means. The League was not present as a mediator as against African Union, which had a plan for resolving Libya’s situation, the plan was not considered in the international community (Perthes, 2014)[123].

In Libya’s situation, the League did not send any military operation as against UAE and Qatar that sent aircraft for patrolling the airspace of Libya. In case of Syria also the League had a distant attitude. Though Syria was a founding member of the League, and Lebanon as well as Yemen was against suspension of Syria from the League and Iraq abstained. In spite of suspension of Syria membership Egypt and Algeria did not recall their ambassadors from Damascus, in Syria as Required by the resolution of the League. The political spilt in the League makes it to continue taking interests in the Persian Gulf monarchies in Saudi Arabia and Qatar. These countries have a dominant role in the League and occupy powerful position and use it for their own advantages. The imposition of the sanction against Damascus, Syria was a primary motive of Saudi Arabia and the decision imposed did not reveal that Damascus had institutionalized the organization’s terms and conditions for resolving the conflict (Bahgat, 2006)[124]. The League had to give recognition to the National Coalition of Opposition Forces in November 2011 that was formed in Doha in Syria.

Libya exposed the weakness within the organization and reflected that it can no longer achieve consensus on sanctions and denunciatory decisions made in the League, Council. In case of Syria, an Arab League observer was appointed at Syria for monitoring of situations, which reflected that security forces did not fire on opposition demonstrator in 2012. The mission head for spearing this activity Sudanese General Mustafa al-Dhabi was discredited and removed from his post, following discussion of the report (Roth, 2011)[125].

The League had therefore reflected on political division throughout the Arab states with oil monarchies heading them. There were opposition forces in the League as well who were growing stronger in order to resists such hegemony. The League held an annual summit in 2012 March in Bagdad, Iraq that established imposition on Damascus, Syria. However, in implementing such a change Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki clearly indicated that he would not change the regime that was functional in the area. In the decision Lebanon leader’s adopted similar decision and Lebanese Foreign Minister Adnan Mansour pleaded the League to restore Syria’s membership with the League in its annual meeting held in Cairo in 2013.

The above political situation within the League however, does not reflect that the League does not have potential to inflict a decision on the member country. The League still has the potential to exert pressure on undesirable regimes around the member states like one in Damascus. Some sources indicate that the League prefers to give away Syria’s seat to the opposition party, though Iraq an Algeria are strongly against such a step taken by the League. Representatives from Iraq have indicated that the League is a forum for Arab states and not for opposition movements. The Persian Gulf monarchies promote the idea of Islamization, and there are no ideological differences in that, however the League needs to strengthen regional security solutions in order to mitigate and counter threat of modern day terrorism. The League has immense potential and resources, that can be utilized using existing capabilities to transform political and ethno-religious conflicts (Gelvin, 2015)[126]. This will enable to maintain peace in the region by reducing chaos, and outside players cannot reap advantage of such situations. The threats of the Persian Gulf Monarchies including the Shiite enclaves, rise of neighboring forces in Iran are the challenges and threats facing the country. The governments existing in the Arab states are unable to cope with the challenges of modern world that can be combated by the League, by its idea of “united Islamic front”. The Arab world is increasingly facing pressures and threats from political chaos and ethno-religious conflict, along with threats from strong armed transnational Islamic group. Human Rights Issues (Mention all these sanctions in details because they are human right issues Libya and Syria)

The first intervention from the AL was in Libya and second one was Syria.


Second World War has experienced several violation and issues in regards to human rights, hence post its completion United Nations adopted Declaration of Human Right protection. Prior to adoption of human rights, it was considered to be an issue of individual state and country hence falling within the premises of national and domestic laws, post U.N adaptation it became an international issue. The adaptation was characterized by adopting several rights and laws within the framework of laws of the land. It is increasingly becoming problematic for the international community to ascertain human rights complications for all countries. International law comprises of a “horizontal legal system,” which is deemed as lacking a ultimate authority (Carter, 2008)[127]. The centralization usage of force and law enforcing systems are generally entrusted to centrally structured institutions. In case of international law, the primary focus is on the absence of a legislation and regarding matters of sanctions as well as compliance amongst domestic legal methods and the international legal methods. Due to international law’s horizontal legal system of operation, it differs from a centralized legal system, which is structured on “principles of reciprocity and consensus” comparative to obedience and enforcement. International law is an essential tool for international scenario as it lets states accomplish obligations, which they select and agree upon. There has been an immense development for the universality of human rights ever since the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights took place in the year 1948. There are various number of human rights conventions that incorporate several areas of human rights including civil, social, political rights, economic rights, the rights of children, women, refugees and minorities. More and more countries in the international community have approved a most of these conventions (Cederman, 2010)[128]. Enforcement mechanisms for the human rights regulations are yet underdeveloped, while a significant development in international human rights law has been noted. The limited scope of jurisdiction as well as in-effective long-delayed justice from the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and other international tribunals. U.S. refusal to join a majority of human rights treaties reflect the international legal enforcement systems for protecting fundamental human rights against gross violations are still under unachieved.

The imposition of sanctions against a particular country for violating any international as well as national norms of regional and international institutions. The League of Arab States imposed economic sanction against Syria in the view to curb the existing crisis (Halberstam, 2009)[129]. The country though a member state have repeatedly violated the Charter Articles of the League, but the imposition led to worsening of humanitarian crisis already existing in the country.

Syria’s state of human rights has been already subject to severe critique from global institutions. Prior to the uprising and revolt in Syria, rights of free expression, association with others and assembly were strictly regulated and organized by their leaders. Syria experienced regime from 1963 till 2011, following which further humanitarian crisis was experienced. The country had banned public gatherings of more than five people. The ruling authority in the government, Ba’athist party granted security forces powers of arrest and detention (Major, 2012)[130].

Reports also included of authorities harassing and imprisoning human rights activists as well as other critics of the ruling governmental party. The detained were indefinitely and tortured in prison-like conditions. The public sector of the country was characterized by women and ethnic minority’s discrimination. The era marked thousands of Syrian Kurds being denied citizenship in the year 1962 and them along with their decedents being labeled “foreigners”. This led to break out of a number of riots in 2004 which prompted increased tension in Syria’s Kurdish areas. There are reports of intermittent clashes amongst the Kurdish protesters and security forces ever since and the revolt continued (Wieland, 2006)[131].

The country seriously hoped desperately for democratic change with the 2000 Damascus Spring, as the Bashar al-Assad led government had failed to implement any improvements and developments in the area. Bashar al-Assad had failed substantially in improving the state of human rights since assuming power as reported by a Human Rights Watch report issued in the commencement of the 2011 uprising.

UN agencies was requested for a single humanitarian emergency an amount of $6.5billion on December 2013, which holds record for the highest sum demanded for a conflict (Miyagawa, 2016)t[132]. The problem encountered to deliver humanitarian assistance to people is demonstrated by the figures for January 2015, which is estimated to be 212,000 people during that month who were overwhelmed by either the government or rebel forces and 304 were reached with food.

The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) in agreement with General Assembly Resolution 46/182, extended the international humanitarian reaction to the war in Syria. The Humanitarian Assistance Response Plan (SHARP) that appealed for USD $1.41 billion for meeting the humanitarian needs of Syrians affected by the war, was the required framework for the coordination in Syria. The official website managed by UNOCHA Syria (Amman) contains the official United Nations data regarding the humanitarian situation and response (Mohamed, 2012)[133]. UNICEF is functioning alongside these existing organizations for providing vaccinations and care packages to children in need. UNICEF has launched several vaccination campaign in order to eradicate polio from the region, as till date 17 cases have already come up since the war broke out.

In 2012 and 2013, USAID along with other U.S. government agencies delivered approximately $385 million of aid articles to various affected parts of Syria. The United States is constantly providing food aid, emergency and basic health care, medical supplies, shelter materials, clean water, hygiene education and supplies, along with other relief supplies. The Islamic Relief has also stocked more than 30 hospitals and directed hundreds thousands of medical and food parcels (Al Faisal, 2012)[134].

The other help that Syria has been receiving is from other countries in the region which contributed considerably to numerous aid levels. Iran exported flour daily to Syria has between 500 and 800 tons. Israel has been providing treatment to approximately 750 Syrians in a field hospital situated in Golan Heights. Some rebels forces of 250 fighters have received medical treatment in the hospital. Encouraged by Gaza Flotilla, a humanitarian convoy departed from Turkey to Syria on 26 April, 2013 (Moret, 2015)[135]. IDPs in Syria and refugees in neighboring states of Egypt, Turkey, Iraq, Jordan and Lebanon are receiving delivery items called Hayat meaning “Life”. Syrian refugees of mostly women and children consist of one quarter of Lebanon’s population. Russia in order to support 3000 refugees created six humanitarian aid centers within Syria in the year 2016 (Zisser, 2012)[136].

Resulting from the crisis situation, the World Health Organization reported that 70% of health care professionals have left the country and 35% of Syria’s hospitals are out of service depending upon the region and extent of revolt. The revolt has led to cases of diarrhea and hepatitis being increasing by more than twofold from 2013. The normal vaccination programs have been seized due to the revolt and conflict in the region. The displaced refugees poses a risk to countries to in which they have resorted to for shelter.

UNOCHA’s Financial Tracking Service has extended several financial assistance in response to the SHARP, for assisting refugees for cross-border operations. The top ten donors to Syria included United States, Kuwait, European Commission, Japan, United Kingdom, Canada, Germany, Saudi Arabia, Norway, and UAE as on 19 September 2015,

Human rights violations have been consecutively committed by the rebel forces as well as by their government, with the “vast majority of the abuses having been committed by the Syrian government”, according to various human rights organizations and United Nations (Morgan T. C., 2014)[137]. The U.N. commission investigated human rights abuses in Syria from its consecutive revolts and civil war and confirms a minimum of 9 intentional mass killings between 2012 to mid-July 2013. The perpetrator was identified mostly as Syrian government and its supporters in eight cases, and the opposition in one case.

According to reports of the Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Network (EMHRN) entitled “Violence against Women, Bleeding Wound in the Syrian Conflict”, nearly 6,000 women have been raped which includes gang-rape, since the conflict started and the figures can be much higher due to underreporting as of late November, 2013 (Boscariol, 2010)[138].

Syrian government officials possibly will face war crimes charges due to a huge supply of evidence trafficked outside the country depicting “systematic killing” of around 11,000 detainees, according to three international lawyers of human rights. Most of the tortured victims were young men and multiple corpses were bloodstained, withered with signs of torture. Some corpses had no eyes and others showed signs of electrocution or strangulation. Authorities comment that the evidence is more detailed and are far higher in scale compared to anything that has appeared from the continued 34-month crisis. On 30 January 2014, Human Rights Watch published a detailed report, where government forces were clearing ground seven anti-government districts in Damascus and Hama, for the period June 2012 and July 2013 that equates to an area the size of 200 football fields (Bracken, 2010)[139]. The reporter witnesses detailed regarding explosives and bulldozers being utilized to knock buildings down. The destruction was a part of collective punishment against residents of rebel-held areas and satellite imagery was contained in the report.

UN reported that “siege warfare is employed in a context of egregious human rights and international humanitarian law violations. The warring parties do not fear being held accountable for their acts.” Armed forces from either sides of the conflict had stopped access of humanitarian convoys; cutting off water supplies confiscated food while targeting farmers working their fields. The reports indicated four places being besieged by governmental forces, Daraya, Muadamiyah, Yarmouk camp and Old City of Homs. There were two prominent areas which were under siege of rebel groups, Aleppo and Hama. In Yarmouk Camp 20,000 residents were prevented from food distribution by UNRWA which led them to face death by starvation, it was blocked by the Syrian government forces and fighting between the army and Jabhat al-Nusra. In July 2015, the UN despite being not able to deliver aid in Yarmouk for four months, removed it from its list of inundated areas in Syria, but declined to explain the reason (Phillips, 2012)[140].

In 2013 250,000 were estimated subjected to relentless shelling and bombardment sieges by government and opposition forces according to the UN. The OCHA’s data published for February 2015 was at 212,000, but a research available in the following month by an American doctors reflected a radical underestimate, that put the number of people inundated by the Syrian military at 640,000. “They are denied humanitarian aid, food and such basic necessities as medical care, and must choose between surrender and starvation,” as commented by members included in the UN Commission of Inquiry. A minimum of 18,866 civilians was killed in Syrian government air attacks on rebel-held areas (Murdie, 2013)[141].

U.N. have accused the ISIS forces of using public executions, amputations and lashings in a operation to implant in fear among civilians. “Forces of the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham have committed torture, murder, acts tantamount to enforced disappearance and forced displacement as part of attacks on the civilian population in Aleppo and Raqqah governorates, amounting to crimes against humanity”, as reported on 27 August, 2014. The new uprising in Syria has also featured disappearances and arbitrary detentions (Sarihan, 2012)[142].


3.3 Regime of Economic Sanctions under the Arab League

3.3.1 Legality of sanction based on the Arab League Charter


The Charter for the League of Arab States lays down the legality of various sanctions as implemented by the Council. Member states are bound by the Articles of the Charter and upon implementing an economic sanction member states need to abide by its rules and regulations pertaining to the sanctions. There were several sanctions implemented by the League and the provisions regarding the same has been provided in Article 5, Article 6 and Article 7 of the Charter. However, the enforcement of such sanctions need to comply with the domestic laws of the state (Zifcak, 2012)[143].

The ARTICLE V of the Charter states that the League shall not apply force of any type in resolving conflict amongst states. The League shall make a decision for the settlement of disputes which the member state needs to abide by. In case of Israel or Syria the League had done several endeavors in resolving their conflicts. The Arab League had imposed on the Syrian government, who had agreed to allow a foreign observer on December, 2011 to monitor Syria’s progress for removing opposition troops from protest areas, negotiating with dissidents and freeing political prisoners. The mission was initiated as a part of the peace plan in order to resolve Syria’s conflict (Öniş, 2012)[144].

The ARTICLE VI of the League Charter provides that the Council can resort to convocation in case of aggression by another country. The decision-making of the League shall hold final in resolving such dispute in the member state.

The ARTICLE VII of the Charter further states that members need to abide by the unanimous decision made by the League. In Syria the League had sent its observer to monitor situation on 26 December, 2011, wherein 67 Arab League’s representative arrive in Syria to monitor situation. On 22 January, 2012 Saudi Arabia withdraws their representatives from Syrian observer mission in the view of rising revolt. Finally on 24th January, 2012 Arab States of the Persian Gulf announces that they will withdraw from the Arab States observer mission in Syria following the rising conflict and worsening of situations. Finally on 28th January, 2012 the League finally suspended the monitoring mission altogether from the critical deterioration of situation in Syria (Bilefsky, 2011)[145]. The mission was applied previous to the sanction aimed at overlooking Syria’s compliance to the terms of the agreement of the Arab States. The League was following the duty of the observer merely hence was non-interventionists in nature. Syria’s opposition forces largely condemned such a observation and followed that these were merely targeted at minorities in the state. The large scale continued conflict and failure to abide by the norms of the League’s Charter led to the economic sanction to be implemented in order to curb Syria (Sharp, 2011)[146].

3.4 Regime of Sanctions for Human Rights Violations

3.4.1 Legality of Sanctions based on Human Rights Violations

The economic sanctions can significantly contribute to decreasing individual states’ human rights violations and hence an effective enforcement tool is the international law. International organizations, including the United Nations, needs to impose economic sanctions that are effective against states that grossly violates human rights as Damascus in Syria, Sudan in the Darfur crisis and Burma. Economic sanctions have been used by the Arab League as well as by U.N. ever since the end of the Cold War (Wood R. M., 2008)[147]. The purpose behind such sanctions is generally not punitive in nature for individual state but for modifying its behavior. In case of such sanctions imposed by individual states, often there has been conflict with other basic principles of international law, as the principle of state sovereignty and non-intervention. The concept of an economic sanctions can potentially encounter with the WTO’s first agenda that promotes free trade. Economic sanctions have been criticized as they are seen to target the people at large, not the regime, who is a violator of international norms. Hence, even though the U.N. and also the Arab League imposes its sanctions to protect human rights, the sanctions often neglect human rights principles (Oskarsson, 2012)[148].

Humanitarian intervention is built on the principle that there needs to be limits to the freedoms states possesses while dealing with their nationals. The doctrine states that, nations needs be separated from activities for protecting a state’s citizen’s abroad (Williams, 2012)[149]. The doctrine was defined by a Dutch international scholar Hugo Grotius along with other legal scholars from the 17th century, that allowed one or more than one states to utilize force in order to stop a state from abusing its citizens in circumstances so brutal and prevalent that they shock the morality and integrity of the international community. The interference in a state’s indigenous affairs is contradicted by certain practices that continue in a state despite protest and complaints by neighboring states or organizations, then humanitarian considerations have often offset the prohibition of intervention and therefore can justify a sanction. Thus, it humanitarian intervention can be summarized as; “ultimately, peace is more endangered by tyrannical contempt for human rights than by attempts to assert, through intervention, the holiness of human personality.” In the 19th century, this doctrine of humanitarian intervention was widely abused by state that intervened to advance in their self-interests (Morgan T. C., 2009)[150]. An ideal example includes, France occupied parts of Syria in the year 1860 and 1861, it policed the coast by warships, on the basis of the doctrine of humanitarian intervention for stopping the massacre of Maronite Christians. The primary motives behind France’s activity have been deeply criticized in the context of the historical record. It is often difficult to reconcile a state’s sovereignty with that of its fundamental human rights and state support for the doctrine of humanitarian intervention by individual states. The Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) has no legal basis in the U.N and rejects humanitarian intervention (Prados, 2006)[151].

The imposition of the economic sanction by the Arab League on Syria had more humanitarian impacts and less on the state. The sanction failed to intervene and curb the violation that have been going on the country since over a decade. The International Human Rights Law, which is made by compiling of declarations of international institutions like the United Nations, treaties, and customary international law. The various practices of human rights generally progressed through state practices, conventions, private entities and the endeavors of NGOs (Portela, 2012)[152]. Thus in the light of the humanitarian crisis that has occurred in Syria it can be criticized that the League has overlooked its consideration in the economic sanction and neglected humanitarian principles.















Chapter Four: Critical Analysis of Enforceability of the AL’s Decisions (35 pages)


Section One: Notion of compliance

  • Definition of Compliance under National Law
  • History of Compliance (Full, Partial, Non-compliance)

Section Two: Enforceability of the AL’s Decisions

  • Enforceability: (Legal reason, Practical reason)

Section Three: The Effectiveness: Impact or the Violation of Economic Sanctions

  • Leading to human Right Violation. (for example Iraq Case, for the First Year Half Million child died because of ES, and it wasn’t enough food and medicine)
    • Increasing Sexual Violence
    • Increasing Murder and Torture
    • Increasing Refuge everywhere in the world
  • Money laundry
  • Black Market

Section three: Research finding based on Questionnaires and interviews with AL participant.

Section Four: Conclusion




Chapter Five: Conclusion Recommendations: (20-25 pages)

Reforming the Arab League Charter.

  • What provisions need to be changed
    • New provision need to be cooperated
    • Why the changes?
    • Propose how the provisions should be written
  • Reform of the National Laws of the AL’s State Members
    • Each AL’s state member should adopt domestic legislation on enforcing AL’s decision/ provisions




















Abou-Zeid, G. (2006). The Arab region: women’s access to the decision-making process across the Arab Nation.

Acharya, A. a. (2007). Comparing regional institutions: an introduction. Crafting cooperation: regional international institutions in comparative perspective, 1-31.

Adami, A. &. (2013). Saudi Arabia and Iran: the Islamic Awakening Case. . Iran Review of Foreign Affairs.

Al Faisal, W. &. (2012). Syria: Public health achievements and the effect of sanctions. INDIAN JOURNAL OF.

Allen, S. H. (2008). Political institutions and constrained response to economic sanctions. Foreign Policy Analysis, 255-274.

Al-Marashi, I. (2016). Regional Organizations as Conflict Mediators? The Arab League and Iraq. Beyond Regionalism?: Regional Cooperation, Regionalism and Regionalization in the Middle East. 139.

Al-Midani, M. (2010). The League of Arab States and the Arab Charter on Human Rights.

Al-Qahtani, M. (2006). The Shanghai cooperation organization and the law of international organizations. Chinese Journal of International Law, 147.

Anas, O. (2013). The changing profile of media in the Arab States. Global Media Journal, 28-46.

ArabLeagueOnline. (Retrieved on 10th Sepetember, 2016). Arab League. //www.arableagueonline.org/.

ArabLeagueSummit2013. (Retrieved on 10th Sepetmber, 2016). Arab League Structure. //arableaguesummit2013.qatarconferences.org/arab-league.html.

Askari, H. (2003). Economic sanctions: Examining their philosophy and efficacy. Greenwood Publishing Group.

Bahgat, G. (2006). Nuclear proliferation: the case of Saudi Arabia. The Middle East Journal, 421-443.

Bahrampour, T. (2011). In Syria, protesters push to end decades of isolation. Washington Post, 17.

Bakan, A. B.-L. (2009). Palestinian resistance and international solidarity: the BDS campaign. Race & Class, 29-54.

Balfour, R. (2012). Changes and continuities in EU-Mediterranean relations after the Arab Spring. An Arab springboard for EU foreign policy, 27-35.

Barnett, M. a. (2007). Designed to fail or failure of design? The origins and legacy of the Arab League. Crafting cooperation: the design and effect of regional institutions in comparative perspective. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming.

Bhardwaj, M. (2012). Development of Conflict in Arab Spring Libya and Syria: From Revolution to Civil War. Washington University International Review, 1(1), 76-97.

Bickerton, I. a. (2007). A history of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson Prentice Hall.

Bilefsky, D. &. (2011). Turkey moves to intensify sanctions against Syria. The New York Times, 30.

Blattman, C. a. (2010). “Civil War”. Journal of Economic Literature, 3-57.

Boscariol, J. W.-S. (2010). Export controls and economic sanctions. . The International Lawyer, 25-44.

Bracken, P. (2010). Fire in the East: the rise of Asian military power and the second nuclear age. Harper Collins.

Bradley, E. C. (2007). Qualitative data analysis for health services research: developing taxonomy, themes, and theory. Health services research, 42(4), 1758-1772.

Brand, L. (2013). Jordan’s Inter-Arab Relations: The Political Economy of Alliance-Making. Columbia University Press.

Brink, H. V. (2006). Fundamentals of research methodology for health care professionals. . Juta and Company Ltd.

Bromley, M. &. (2012). Policies on Exports of Arms to States affected by the Arab Spring. SIPRI Yearbook 2012: Armaments. Disarmament and International Security, 275-279.

Burleigh, M. (2008). Blood and rage: a cultural history of terrorism. HarperPress.

Byman, D. L. (2008). Things fall apart: Containing the spillover from an Iraqi civil war. . Brookings Institution Press.

Carpenter, T. G. (2013). Tangled web: The syrian civil war and its implications. . Mediterranean Quarterly, 1-11.

Carter, B. E. (2008). International economic sanctions. . Cambridge Books.

Cederman, L. E. (2010). Democratization and civil war: Empirical evidence. Journal of Peace Research, 377-394.

Chaney, E. (2012). Democratic change in the Arab world, past and present. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2012(1), 363-414.

Christensen, P. a. (2008). Research with children: Perspectives and practices. . Routledge.

Colombo, S. (2012). The GCC countries and the Arab Spring. Between outreach, patronage and repression.

Coskun, B. (2008). Regionalism and securitization: The case of the Middle East. Beyond Regionalism?: Regional Cooperation. Regionalism and Regionalization in the Middle East, 89-106.

Cova, B. E. (2008). Everything you always wanted to know about interpretive consumer research but were afraid to ask. Qualitative Market Research: An International Journal, 11(2), 121-129.

Cox, D. G. (2006). Democratic sanctions: Connecting the democratic peace and economic sanctions. . Journal of Peace Research, 709-722.

Dabashi, H. (2012). The Arab Spring: the end of postcolonialism.

de Jonge Oudraat, C. (2010). Making economic sanctions work. Survival.

Diamond, L. (2010). Why are there no arab democracies?. Journal of democracy, 21(1), 93-112.

Dickson-Swift, V. J. (2007). Doing sensitive research: what challenges do qualitative researchers face?. Qualitative research, 7(3), 327-353.

Doran, M. (2011). Heirs of Nasser: Who Will Benefit from the Second Arab Revolution. Foreign Aff. 90, 17.

Dörnyei, Z. (2007). Research methods in applied linguistics: Quantitative, qualitative, and mixed methodologies. Oxford University Press.

Eriksson, M. &. (2011). Why the EU’s sanctions against Assad’s Syria will backfire. Foreign Affairs, 1.

Escribà‐Folch, A. &. (2010). Dealing with tyranny: International sanctions and the survival of authoritarian rulers1. International Studies Quarterly, 335-359.

Fandy, M. (2007). (Un) civil war of words: media and politics in the Arab world. Greenwood Publishing Group.

Fearon, J. D. (2007). Ethnic minority rule and civil war onset. . American Political science review, 187-193.

Fearon, J. D. (2007). Iraq’s civil war. Foreign Aff, 2.

Gelbart, J. (2010). e Iran-Syria Axis: A Critical Investigation. Stanford Journal of International Relations, 12(1), 36-41.

Gelvin, J. L. (2015). The Arab uprisings: what everyone needs to know. OUP Us.

Gifkins, J. (2012). The UN security council divided: Syria in crisis. Global Responsibility to Protect, 377-393.

Gomm, R. (n.d.). Social research methodology: A critical introduction. . Palgrave Macmillan.

Goodarzi, J. (2006). Syria and Iran. London: Tauris Academic.

Gottemoeller, R. (2007). The Evolution of Sanctions in Practice and Theory. Survival. 99-110.

Habibi, N. (2012). Turkey and Iran: Growing economic relations despite western sanctions. Middle East Brief, 62.

Hafner-Burton, E. M. (2008). Power or Plenty How Do International Trade Institutions Affect Economic Sanctions?. Journal of conflict Resolution, 213-242.

Halberstam, D. &. (2009). The United Nations, the European Union, and the King of Sweden: economic sanctions and individual rights in a plural world order. . Common Market Law Review, 46.

Hannon, E. &. (2013). From Peaceful Demonstrations to Armed Conflict: Considering Humanitarian Intervention in the Case of Syria. Elayne Hannon and Hannah Russell, From Peaceful Demonstrations to Civil War: Considering Humanitarian Intervention in the Case of Syria (Al-Marsad, 2013).

Herrera, L. (2007). Higher education in the Arab world. In International handbook of higher education. Springer Netherlands.

Hertog, S. (2007). The GCC and Arab economic integration: a new paradigm. Middle East Policy, 52.

Hinnebusch, R. (2012). Syria: from ‘authoritarian upgrading’to revolution?. International Affairs, 88(1), 95-113.

Hoekman, B. &. (2010). Arab economic integration: missing links.

Hoekman, B. a. (2009). Changes in cross-border trade costs in the Pan-Arab free trade area, 2001-2008. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper Series.

Hokayem, E. &. (2013). Syria’s Uprising and the Fracturing of the Levant. Milton Park: Routledge.

Hufbauer, G. C. (2007). Using Sanctions to Fight Terrorism1. Terrornomics, 179.

Iltis, T. (2016). Syria: Amid a multi-sided conflict, a feminist revolution provides hope. Green Left Weekly, 15.

Jenkins, B. M. (2014). The Dynamics of Syria’s Civil War.

Jreisat, J. E. (2006). The Arab World Reform or Stalemate. Journal of Asian and African studies, 411-437.

Kabbara, K. (2015). International Intervention and the Arab uprisings: the cases of Libya, Syria and Bahrain (Doctoral dissertation, Lebanese American University).

Kamrava, M. (2012). The Arab Spring and the Saudi-led counterrevolution. Orbis, 56(1), 96-104.

Katz, M. N. (2006). Putin’s foreign policy toward Syria.

Khodadady, E. &. (2014). Ideology in the BBC and Press TV’s coverage of Syria unrest: A schema-based approach. . Review of Journalism and Mass Communication, 47-67.

King, M. a. (2009). A quiet revolution: the first Palestinian Intifada and nonviolent resistance. Nation Books.

Koul, L. (2009). Methodology Of Educational Research,4Enew E. Vikas Publishing House Pvt Ltd.

Küçükkeleş, M. (2012). Arab League’s Syrian Policy. SETA Policy Brief. 4.

Landis, J. (2012). The Syrian Uprising of 2011: Why the Asad Regime Is Likely to Survive to 2013. Middle East Policy, 72-84.

Laqueur, W. a. (2008). The Israel-Arab Reader: A Documentary History of the Middle East Conflict: Seventh Revised and Updated E. Penguin.

Lesch, D. a. (2012). The Arab Spring: Change and Resistance in the Middle East. . Westview Press.

Lesch, D. W. (2011). The Arab spring–and winter–in Syria. Global Change. Peace & Security, 421-426.

Levitt, M. (2010). Foreign Fighters and Their Economic Impact: A Case Study of Syria and al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). . Perspectives on Terrorism.

Lischer, S. K. (2006). Dangerous sanctuaries: refugee camps, civil war, and the dilemmas of humanitarian aid. . Cornell University Press.

Lizza, R. (2011). The consequentialist. The New Yorker, 38-46.

Lyme, R. F. (2012). Sanctioning Assad’s Syria: mapping the economic, socioeconomic and political repercussions of the international sanctions imposed on Syria since March 2011. . Copenhagen, Denmark: Danish Institute for International Studies.

Lynch, M. F. (2014). Syria’s socially mediated civil war. . United States Institute Of Peace, 1-35.

MacDonald, R. (2015). The League of Arab States: A Study in Dynamics of Regional Organization. Princeton University Press.

MacFarquhar, N. a. (2011). Isolating Syria, Arab League Imposes Broad Sanctions. . The New York Times, 27.

Mackenzie, N. a. (2006). Research dilemmas: Paradigms, methods and methodology. Issues in educational research, 16(2), 193-205.

Mackey, A. a. (2015). Second language research: Methodology and design. Routledge.

Maddy-Weitzman, B. (2012). The Arab league comes alive. . Middle East Quarterly.

Maddy-Weitzman, B. (2013). The Arab League and the Arab Uprisings. Arab Spring and Arab Thaw: Unfinished Revolutions and the Quest for Democracy, 179-193.

Major, S. (2012). Timing is everything: Economic sanctions, regime type, and domestic instability. International Interactions, 79-110.

Mangu, A. M. (2012). The Arab Spring and the African Union’s Reaction to the Crisis. Africa Insight.

Mann, M. (2012). The sources of social power: Volume 3, global empires and revolution, 1890-1945 (Vol. 3). Cambridge University Press.

Marauhn, T. (2012). Sailing Close to the Wind: Human Rights Council Fact-Finding in Situations of Armed Conflict-The Case of Syria. Cal. W. Int’l LJ, 401.

Masters, J. (2012). The Arab League. Council on Foreign Relations, 26.

Mazaheri, N. (2010). Iraq and the domestic political effects of economic sanctions. The Middle East Journal, 253-268.

McDermott, R. (2007). Presidential leadership, illness, and decision making. . Cambridge University Press.

McLean, E. V. (2010). Friends or foes? Major trading partners and the success of economic sanctions. . International Studies Quarterly, 427-447.

Meskela, A. Z. (2013). The Syrian Crisis and External Involvement: Geopolitical and Security Dimensions, March 2011 to December 2012. Available at SSRN 2515481.

Miyagawa, M. (2016). Do economic sanctions work?. Springer.

Mohamed, S. (2012). The UN Security Council and the Crisis in Syria. American Society of International Law.

Mohamedou, M. M. (2016). Arab agency and the UN project: the League of Arab States between universality and regionalism. Third World Quarterly, 1219-1233.

Momani, B. (2007). A Middle East free trade area: economic interdependence and peace considered. . The World Economy, 1682-700.

Moret, E. S. (2015). Humanitarian impacts of economic sanctions on Iran and Syria. European Security, 120-140.

Morgan, T. C. (2009). The threat and imposition of economic sanctions, 1971—2000. . Conflict Management and Peace Science, 92-110.

Morgan, T. C. (2014). Threat and imposition of economic sanctions 1945–2005: Updating the TIES dataset. Conflict Management and Peace Science, 0738894213520379.

Morris, B. (2008). 1948: a history of the first Arab-Israeli war. . Yale University Press.

Mostafiz, M. (2013). Syrian Conflict; Dilemmas and Challenges in Peaceful Settlement. . Dilemmas and Challenges in Peaceful Settlement (July 5, 2013).

Moussa, A. (2012). The UN and the League of Arab States: A Point of View on Future Interaction. Springer Netherlands.

Murdie, A. &. (2013). The impact of human rights INGO activities on economic sanctions. . The Review of International Organizations, 33-53.

Nassar-McMillan, S. C.-R. (2011). Counseling & diversity: Counseling Arab Americans. Brooks/Cole.

Negrón-Gonzales, M. (2015). Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC). nternational Organizations and the Implementation of the Responsibility to Protect: The Humanitarian Crisis in Syria, 90.

Neo, J. (Retrieved on 10th September, 2016). Arab League in regional and international politics. //journal-neo.org/2013/03/17/the-new-role-of-the-arab-league-in-regional-and-international-relations/.

Neuman, W. a. (2012). Basics of social research: Qualitative and quantitative approaches.

Noor, K. (2008). Case study: A strategic research methodology. American journal of applied sciences, 5(11), 1602-1604.

Nye Jr, J. a. (2016). Understanding global conflict and cooperation: an introduction to theory and history. . Pearson.

Öniş, Z. (2012). Turkey and the Arab Spring: between ethics and self-interest. Insight Turkey, 45-63.

Osgood, J. (2006). Caesar’s legacy: civil war and the emergence of the Roman Empire. . Cambridge University Press.

Oskarsson, K. (2012). Economic sanctions on authoritarian states: Lessons learned. . Middle East Policy, 88-102.

Ottaway, D. B. (2010). The Arab Tomorrow. . The Wilson Quarterly, 48.

ÖZDEN, H. (2016). TURKEY AND SYRIA FROM 2011 TO 2013: FROM INTIMACY TO A DILEMMA. Electronic Turkish Studies.

Peffers, K. T. (2007). A design science research methodology for information systems research. Journal of management information systems, 24(3), 45-77.

Peksen, D. (2009). Better or worse? The effect of economic sanctions on human rights. Journal of Peace Research, 59-77.

Perthes, V. (2014). Syria under Bashar al-Asad: modernisation and the limits of change. . Routledge.

Peterson, T. M. (2011). Sanctioning Violence The Effect of Third-Party Economic Coercion on Militarized Conflict. . Journal of Conflict Resolution, 580-605.

Phillips, C. (2012). After the Arab Spring: power shift in the Middle East?: Syria’s bloody Arab Spring.

Pierret, T. (2013). Religion and state in Syria: The Sunni Ulama from coup to revolution (Vol. 41). Cambridge University Press.

Pinfari, M. (2009). Nothing but failure?: the Arab League and the Gulf Cooperation Council as mediators in Middle Eastern conflicts. Crisis States Research Centre.

Pintak, L. (2008). The role of the media as watch-dogs, agenda-setters and gate-keepers in Arab states. In Harvard-World Bank Workshop , 29-31.


Prados, A. B. (2006). Syria: US Relations and Bilateral Issues.

Price, E. M. (2008). A charter of contradictions. Arab Media & Society.

Rabinovich, I. (2008). The view from Damascus: state, political community and foreign relations in twentieth-century Syria. Mitchell Vallentine & Company.

Raphaeli, N. (2007). Syria’s fragile economy. Middle East Review of International Affairs, 34-51.

Ravid, B. (2008). Defense establishment paper: Golan for Syria peace, plan for Iran strike. Haaretz Newspaper, 29.

Rishmawi, M. (2010). The Arab Charter on Human Rights and the League of Arab States: An Update. . Human Rights Law Review, 10(1), 169-178.

Roach, S. C. (2014). International relations: the key concepts. Routledge.

Roth, K. (2011). Time to abandon the autocrats and embrace rights. New York, Human Rights Watch.

Ryan, C. (2012). The new Arab cold war and the struggle for Syria. Middle East Report, 262, 28-31.

Salehyan, I. &. (2006). Refugees and the spread of civil war. International Organization, 335.

Sambanis, N. &.-W. (2009). What’s in a line? Is partition a solution to civil war?. International Security, 82-118.

Sapsford, R. a. (2006). Data collection and analysis. Sage.

Sarihan, A. (2012). Is the Arab spring in the third wave of democratization? The case of Syria and Egypt. . Turkish Journal of Politics, 67.

Sela, A. (2012). Decline of the Arab-Israeli Conflict, The: Middle East Politics and the Quest for Regional Order. SUNY Press.

Sen, K. A.-F. (2013). Syria: effects of conflict and sanctions on public health. Journal of public health, 195-199.

Shagabutdinova, E. &. (2007). Deploying Sanctions while Protecting Human Rights: Are Humanitarian “Smart” Sanctions Effective?. Journal of Human Rights, 59-74.

Sharara, S. L. (2014). War and infectious diseases: Challenges of the Syrian civil war. . PLoS Pathog, e1004438.

Sharp, J. M. (2011). Unrest in Syria and US Sanctions Against the Asad Regime. . Current Politics and Economics of the Middle East, 437.

Shlaim, A. (2009). Israel and Palestine: Reappraisals, revisions, refutations. Verso Books.

Shlaim, A. (2009). Israel and Palestine: Reappraisals, revisions, refutations. . Verso Books.

Silverman, D. e. (2016). Qualitative research. Sage.

Solberg-Henriet, H. L. (2015). Responsibility to Protect in Application: A Comparative Analysis of Libya and Syria during the Arab spring.

Souleimanov, E. A. (2014). Globalizing Jihad? North Caucasians in the Syrian Civil War. . Middle East Policy, 154-162.

Sunstein, C. (2009). The Second Bill of Rights: FDR’s Unfinished Revolution–And Why We Need It More Than Ever. Basic Books.

Suresh, D. (2015). Civil War: India’s Policy on Syria. Available at SSRN.

Sutherland, E. (2011). International mobile roaming in the Arab states. info, 13(2), 35-52.

Takeyh, R. (2006). Iran, Israel and the politics of terrorism. Survival, 83-96.

Taylor, S. B. (2015). . Introduction to qualitative research methods: A guidebook and resource. John Wiley & Sons.

Toffolo, C. (2008). The arab league. . Infobase Publishing.

Toft, M. D. (2007). Getting religion? The puzzling case of Islam and civil war. International Security, 97-131.

Vignal, L. (2012). Syria: anatomy of a Revolution. Books and Ideas.

Weiss, T. G. (2014). After Syria, Whither R2P?. . Into the Eleventh Hour, 36.

Wieland, C. (2006). Syria at Bay: Secularism, Islamism and” Pax Americana”. C. HURST & CO. PUBLISHERS.

Williams, P. R. (2012). Preventing mass atrocity crimes: The responsibility to protect and the Syria crisis. Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law, 45.

Wilson, D. N. (2012). The Arab Spring: Comparing US Reactions in Libya and Syria. . ARMY WAR COLL CARLISLE BARRACKS PA.

Wood, E. J. (2008). The social processes of civil war: The wartime transformation of social networks. Annu. Rev. Polit. Sci., 539-561.

Wood, R. M. (2008). “A Hand upon the Throat of the Nation”: Economic Sanctions and State Repression, 1976–2001. International Studies Quarterly, 489-513.

Yacoubian, M. (2008). Promoting Middle East Democracy II: Arab Initiatives. DIANE Publishing.

Yetiv, S. (2011). Explaining foreign policy: US decision-making in the Gulf Wars. JHU Press.

Yildiz, K. (2007). The Kurds in Iraq: the past, present and future. Pluto Press.

Yitzhak, R. (2008). The Question of Arab Solidarity in the 1948 War: Political Interests versus Military Considerations. Mediterranean Quarterly, 19(2), 19-46.

Zahlan, R. (2016). The origins of the United Arab Emirates: A political and social history of the Trucial States. Routledge.

Ziadeh, R. (2013). Revolution in Syria: The Struggle for Freedom in a Regional Battle. Arab Spring and Arab Thaw: The Unfinished Revolutions and the Quest for Democracy, 93-113.

Zifcak, S. (2012). Responsibility to Protect after Libya and Syria. The. Melb. J. Int’l L, 59.

Ziser, E. (2007). Commanding Syria: Bashar al-Asad and the first years in power (Vol. 60). IB Tauris.

Zisser, E. (2012). The ‘Struggle for Syria’: Return to the Past? Mediterranean Politics, 105-110.

Zongze, R. (2012). Responsible protection: building a safer world. China International Studies, 34.



"Are you looking for this answer? We can Help click Order Now"