Although Article 34 TFEU lay down the foundation regarding the universal principle of the movement of commodities without any charges, it has ignored the rights and privileges of the affiliate nation to control their own markets including the quest of their own policies (Horspool, 2014). Through its interpretation, the court of justice has done little to guarantee protection of the rights of member states. Article 34 TFEU doesn’t pertain when there is fully coordination by the system means and adopted directions by all the European Union members. According to Horspool (2014), this is attributed to the information that legislation harmonization connected to the substantiation of the principle of movement without charge where authentic rights and duties are observed in the event of precise products.

The definition of procedures having the same effect under Article 34 TFEU


According to this article, there is the prohibition of the affiliate states on the subject of quantitative limitations put on imports and actions having corresponding effects. But the provision does not give an exact meaning in terms of all actions having equal effects. Wiberg (2014) argues that in Dassonville, the court seized that these words included all the policies of trading enacted by the associate states that can hamper real or possible, direct or meandering, intra-community trade well thought-out as procedures having an effect equal to the limitations of a quantitative character

Horspool (2014) reiterates that this explanation from the court of justice is far from being as prepared as is alleged from time to time. This is for the reason that it begs a question of the procedures constituting the policies of trading, along with the seriousness impact, must a measure have before it hinders the business of intra-community. If any, the verdict from the Court has emotionally involved very little in the use of the significance to whether the endeavor of national rules is to manage business in commodities or they trail additional aims. The phrases all measures, trading rules and all commercial rules have been used interchangeably in the legal opinion, thus declaring out any limits on the subject of regulatory in accordance with national law.

Equally, the court of justice as constantly refused in belief the use of any de minimis test stipulated in Article 34 TFEU in the circumstance that the national gauge capable of reducing the trade of intra-community. Measures affecting trade barely potentially or circuitously therefore fall within a trade restriction definition. In fact, the court has overlooked the arithmetical confirmation in some of the cases indicating that imports have improved even more when those actions are not present. For this reason, the meaning of a trade limit has become all-inclusive including the enormous swaths validity of national regulations that depends on justification-test, and the proportionally encompassed in Article 34 TFEU (Horspool, 2014).

According to Wiberg (2014), this leads to the lawful confidence decline for the partner states and the traders, indicating a noteworthy threat to the legal burden for the court itself. The Sunday-trading account confirms that the court is conscious of these concerns and according to Wiberg (2014), its verdict in the Kech; a particular set of policies regarding the national convention, is an attempt to convene them. Also, the court of justice in truth has come close to the beginning of a de minimus test. This is through holding that the preventive effects that a national gauge has on the open movement of merchandise may be circuitous and vague for it regarded as able in hindering trade between affiliate states called the case ruling of Krantz (Horspool, 2014). Wiberg (2014) argues that while the jurisprudence of Keck has been criticized for being very rigid as well as not capable to hold every real obstruction to doing business, there is a dispute that the ruling involving the case of Krantz is really complex to use thereby leading to the legal doubt. This shows how complicated it is in the institution of suitable scale of Article 34 TFEU (Groff, 2010).


The use of limits as the measures of the corresponding effect

Wiberg (2014) says that the application of restriction as a measure of equivalent effect is also another problem with the Article 34 TFEU not to accommodate the constitutional rights along with the privileges of the member states to control their market. This measure allows the importation and promotion of certain produce but restricts on when, how or where to use the product. This kind of regulations commonly applied in the legislations of affiliate states. For instance, a certain age bound is an obligation for an individual to use or acquire some products. This type of regulations ensures that minors prevented from some goods such as alcohol. According to Kochenov (2011), this notion as well involves the rules that prohibit the utilization of goods in other areas. For instance, this involves the interdiction on the use of phones in airplanes and other sensitive areas or the prevention of the use of fireworks saves during certain days of a year. It can also involve local planning rules banning the usage of certain brands of tiles and bricks when constructing houses.

According to Berry, Homewood & Bogusz (2013), this concept also covers the wearing of certain kinds of clothing in open areas such as the wearing of the burka. Analyzing these constraint examples, it is critical to judging whether regarded as the trade limits and their significance to be highlighted in Article 34 TFEU. Although traditionally this Court has not distinguished between the legislations of the states that ban the use of some produce concerned and the rules restraining its legal use, Berry et al. (2013) argues that in a sequence of legal cases involving a stern employment of restrictions, the classic Dawsonville test has been applied to establish such legislations to be procedures for corresponding effects without the applicability of the ruling of Krantz and the ketch reasoning case. According to Kochenov (2011), in the commission vs. Portugal, the focus was whether the ban of the Portuguese on the affixing of tinted film to the windows of passengers or merchandise vehicles cut down foul of Article 34 TFEU. Noting that the solitary exclusion to the Portuguese prohibition worried the affixing of tinted films to the commodities compartments of vehicles and to the non-wheeled vehicles The court of justice held that probable customers or persons do not virtually have any interest in buying them having the knowledge that such pictures being affixed to the windows and window screen beside the passengers seated in the vehicles banned. Moreover, the society legislators viewed the application of limits as capable of consulting trade constraint. Examples of such regulations enclosed by the responsibility to notify the technical regulations under Directive 98/34 on giving out the process for the stipulation of information in the subject matter of technological principles and other regulations.

Berry et al. (2013), argues that the Court specify that the task of notifications applies not merely to the developed outlaw on the utilization, but as well to the procedures of the states. This leaves no room for the use that is sensibly of the concerned products as an alternative to shortening the marginal one. In recent times, some cases gave the court a chance to re-evaluate this sort of case law. Berry et al. (2013) further reiterates that the case law of Commission versus Italy; it incorporated the embargo by an Italian ban on attaching trailers to motorcycles. The court discovered that the Italian law in subject did sum to a trade limit. Due to this opinion, this case was referred to the Grand Chamber that invited the parties involved and affiliate states to give their opinion on whether national use limits are considered as procedures having related effect to quantitative limits. All the affiliate states present agreed that there is a need for assessment regarding the use of restrictions such as in the selling provision, and consequently it should be barred from the scale of Article 34 TFEU. This stated that the state of affairs lay down by this court in the judgment of Keck was met.

According to Groff (2010), the other case of Mickelsson concerned a Swedish law that distinct the waters in which lawfully imported and sold person watercraft used. These regulations imposed a universal prohibition on individual watercraft maritime in all waters of Swedish excluding the universal navigable waterways. The defendants Roos and Mickelsson reiterated that the Swedish directive was diverse to this Article. This is attributed the outlaw greatly abridged the awareness of probable customers in doing business of person watercrafts. The administration of the country in question disagreed that the regulations constituted a gauge of the corresponding effect; hence they were necessary for any occasion. This is for the reason that the condition was not different from when an affiliate state regulates where vehicles of land-based are accepted to drive. The Anthony General entirely agreed with the government of Sweden’s advance (Berry et al., 2013).

The integrated market access analysis for all national procedures

Kochenov (2011) reiterates that basing on the Judgment in Trailers, where the court of justice stated that Article 34 TFEU involves not only the products but also any other procedures that prohibit the access of products coming from other affiliate states to the market of an affiliate state. This can make one conclude that the court of justice has introduced a market right of entry as a new of overarching test used. This is when analyzing case-by-case basis and all national procedures to establish whether they are in the scale of Article 34 TFEU. Paying attention, the market right of entry test seems less narrative and practically important. The Court of Justice has always been pre-occupied with ensuring market access for foreign products, even though, the Court has applied a variety of terms to show that concern. Furthermore, the market access test does not give an operative criterion that is specific for how to evaluate whether a given national rule impedes national market right of entry adequately to be adopted by Article 34 TFEU (Groff, 2010). As a result, in practice, the test does not lead to vital changes in circumstances of outcome while compared with earlier Case law. This makes the originality of the market right of entry test to be more terminological rather than substantive. It is demonstrated by the position of arrangements after the Trailer’s case law. In the Judgment, Trailers prescribes a case-by-case evaluation of whether an unbiased selling agreement impedes a market right of entry. Though, straight away before stating that a market right of entry standard has become a relevant measure, the Court restates Keck and maintains that a selling provision that fulfills the two circumstances on realistic and lawful fairness is not by nature e.g. to stop their right to enter the market. According to Gutman (2014), it is vital to read Trailers as a cause that no personal evaluation under the market right to entry criterion needs to be made relative to those categories of national procedures for which the Court of integrity has previously made that evaluation.

Certainly, there will be no real meaning of the separation between selling measures and other procedures if a market and right of entry test were to be carried out in all cases relating to selling provisions in the similar way as in other case regarding Article 34 TFEU. Gutman (2014) furthermore reiterates that it is not important for the Court of Justice to reiterate that fully fair selling measures since by nature they do not create problems in a market right of entry test. From the latest case law, in Fachverband, the Court of integrity continued to relate the classic logic and even referred to Trailers in supporting the suggestion that selling arrangement do not need analysis at the center of latest case-by-case market right of entry test. Likewise, in Ker-Optika regarding a national legislation authorizing the selling of contact lenses in shops that only specialize in medical devices, first the Court of Justice restarted the universal rights to enter the market in Trailers. It also referred to Keck and holding that, it was essential to examine if the national legislations at question in the core events apply to other relevant traders working within the national territories. Indeed, while the market right to entry appears recognized as the test unifying in Article 34 Trade Free European Union (TFEU), there is variation on the use of the test that changes depending on the kind of the national measure at hand.

Finding the appropriate threshold

To understand this, it is imperative to look at two questions. First if a national court faced with a case involving a use restriction seeking information as the level to which that restriction decreases the quantity of imports. Secondly, the amount in which the import volumes reduced so as to be caught in Article 34 TFEU. In the first question, the national cost doesn’t have to involve a complicated economic investigation trade volume, but look at the degree in which the national gauge restricts. In Trailers and Mickelsson, the court of justice focused on the particulars of the regulations at hand, prevented the use of products for intrinsic and exact reasons. In contrast, parties involved were not invited to the Court, so that to look for arithmetical information on the real effects of the contested national laws (Gutman, 2014).

On the second question, Article34 TFEU involves the National procedures that have the prospect to hinder trade and till now the Court has refused to use a de minimis test. This is in the classic Dassonvile formula. According to AG Kotott, in Mickelsson, the application of this formula will lead to irrational wide delimitation of what confines on the use comprise procedures of the corresponding effect. It is proposed that national procedures that limit to a degree the universal value of a produce shouldn’t be added in Article 34 TFEU (Barnard, 2010)


Looking at the case studies and the academic opinion, there is uncertainty about the relationship between Article 34 TFEU and national rules to accommodate the rights of member states to regulate their market and pursue their policies. This is through disagreements on national rules regulating how, where, when and to whom a product legal imported and marketed used. Based on the evidence from the key Court of Justice verdict, it is possible to conclude that it has not done enough in its interpretation for Article 34 TFEU in accommodating the rights of the affiliate states. These rules fall within the context of Article 34.They influence the consumers’ behavior hence affecting the products access to the national market at the national level. All the concerned parties need to come together so that to lay down important policies to influence the court to accommodate the rights of affiliate States in its interpretation of Article 34 TFEU.


Horspool, M. (2014). European union law. Oxford: Oxford university press

Wiberg, M. (2014). The EU services directive: law or simply policy? Press.BARNARD, C. (2013). The substantive law of the EU: the four freedoms

Berry, E., Homewood, M., & Bogusz, B. (2013). Complete EU law: text, cases, and materials

Kochenov, D. (2011). EU law of the overseas: outermost regions, associated overseas countries and territories, territories sui generis. Alphen aan den Rijn, The Netherlands, Kluwer Law International.

Gray, H. (2013). Surveying the Foundations: Article 34 TFEU and the Common European Asylum System. Liverpool Law Rev, 34(3), pp.175-193.

Groff, L. (2010). Discrimination Disguised: The Market Access Test of Article 34 TFEU. SSRN Journal.

Barnard, C. (2010) The Substantive Law of the EU: The Four Freedoms. Oxford: Oxford UP

Gutman, K. (2014). Constitutional foundations of European contract law: a comparative analysis. Oxford, United Kingdom, Oxford University Press

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